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ARTICLE
CONVICTIONS AS GUILT
Anna Roberts*
A curious tension exists in scholarly discourse about the criminal legal
system. On the one hand, a copious body of work exposes a variety of facets
of the system that jeopardize the reliability of convictions. These include
factors whose influence is pervasive: the predominance of plea bargaining,
for example, and the subordination of the defense. On the other hand,
scholars often discuss people who have criminal convictions in a way that
appears to assume crime commission. This apparent assumption obscures
crucial failings of the system, muddies the role of academia, and, given the
unequal distribution of criminal convictions, risks compounding race- and
class-based stereotypes of criminality. From careful examination of this
phenomenon and its possible explanations, reform proposals emerge.
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INTRODUCTION
The way in which we speak about the criminal legal system is often in
tension with the way in which we speak about those who have been through
it.1 Facets of the system that jeopardize its reliability often seem to be
forgotten when we speak of those with convictions; legal guilt (which I use
here to mean conviction) often seems to provoke an assumption of factual
guilt (which I use here to mean commission of the crime). Thus, even when
we urge more favorable treatment of those with convictions—that they
should receive a second chance, redemption, rehabilitation, and so on—we
risk obscuring flaws in the conviction-production process and reinforcing
harmful stereotypes about where guilt resides.
Who is “we”? In previous scholarship, I have written about assumptions
of guilt, and assumptions about the meaning of convictions, on the part of

1. For more information about the phrase “criminal legal system,” see infra note 407 and
accompanying text.
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police officers,2 jurors,3 judges,4 defense attorneys,5 legislators,6
prosecutors,7 and members of the public.8 One can only point elsewhere for
so long. In this Article, I focus on the role of legal scholars. Some who work
within the criminal system may be constrained in their ability to question the
reliability of convictions.9 But the scholarly role is surely different and
critically important.
Legal scholars have, on the one hand, generated an expansive literature
exploring factors that can jeopardize the reliability of convictions as markers
of factual guilt. These factors include those that are identified by innocence
scholars as the primary contributing causes of “false convictions.”10 But they
extend further, into areas more central to this Article’s focus. Whereas the
“Innocence Movement” has focused on “wrong-man convictions,”11 scholars
have pointed out that one can be factually innocent of a crime for a number
of reasons other than being the “wrong man.”12 One may be the right man,
to the extent that there is one, but lack the mens rea (mental state) that
constitutes part of that crime.13 One may be the right man but have a winning
2. See Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony: Prior
Conviction Impeachment and the Fight Against Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835,
865–66 (2016).
3. See Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1503, 1530 (2015) [hereinafter Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness]; Anna Roberts,
Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 2015 (2016) [hereinafter Roberts,
Conviction by Prior Impeachment].
4. See Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 998 (2019).
5. See id.
6. See Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 586
(2014).
7. Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)use of
Batson, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1359, 1404 (2012).
8. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1018–19.
9. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?: On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1985) (“Successful projection of a
legal rule depends on a court’s ability to cast a verdict not as a statement about the evidence
presented at trial, but as a statement about a past act—a statement about what happened.”);
see also Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1393 (1997) (“[A]n adjudicatory system has
to operate on the premise that those duly convicted are guilty.”); id. at 1334 (“Even if innocents
are convicted, the criminal justice system cannot formally acknowledge this because it will
undermine society’s faith in the system.”).
10. See Samuel Gross, What We Think, What We Know, and What We Think We Know
About False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 753, 772 (2017) (discussing mistaken
witness identification, false accusation, false confession, forensic evidence, and official
misconduct).
11. See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1157 n.1 (2010)
(offering definitions of the Innocence Movement); Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89
N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2011).
12. See Erik Lillquist, Balancing Errors in the Criminal Justice System, 41 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 175, 184 (2008).
13. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1327–28 (explaining that the narrow definition of
innocence as “‘factual innocence,’ meaning that the defendant was not the perpetrator . . .
leaves out several important categories of convicted innocents, such as those lacking the
appropriate mens rea, those possessing a complete defense, and those erroneously convicted
in an error-free trial”).
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affirmative defense.14 This Article focuses on two facets of our system that
are recognized within legal scholarship as jeopardizing the reliability of
convictions even if the right man might be on the hook: the predominance
of the guilty plea and the subordination of the defense.
The incentives that tend toward guilty pleas,15 and the lack of safeguards
involved in the plea process,16 create a significant risk of convictions
incurred in the absence of factual guilt.17 The proportion of convictions that
are the product of guilty pleas—as high as 97 percent in some courts18—
illustrates the importance of this concern. In both plea bargaining and the
trial process, the subordinate status of defense representation—in areas that
include caseloads, resources, standards, and incentives—creates a significant
risk that convictions will be imposed in the absence of guilt. Again, given
the prevalence of defense representation (including indigent defense
representation),19 the reach of this issue is immense. Indeed, where there is
no defense representation, defendants may be still more vulnerable.
The scholarship highlighting these two factors (plus the scholarship
focused on those factors more commonly associated with “innocence”)
should reveal the problematic nature of an assumption that convictions
connote crime commission. Of course, one cannot come up with a figure that
quantifies a “mismatch” between crime commission and crime conviction.20
To answer the question of whether a crime occurred requires not only
detailed knowledge of the law but also detailed knowledge of the facts. In
14. See 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 21 (2019) (“Possible bars to
conviction include alcoholism, alibi, amnesia, authority to maintain order and safety,
brainwashing, chromosomal abnormality, consent, convulsion, custodial authority, defense of
habitation, defense of others, defense of property, de minimis infraction, diplomatic immunity,
domestic (or special) responsibility, double jeopardy, duress, entrapment, executive immunity,
extreme emotional disturbance, hypnotism, immaturity, impaired consciousness,
impossibility, incompetency, insanity, intoxication (voluntary and involuntary), involuntary
act defenses, judicial authority, judicial immunity, justification, law enforcement authority,
legislative immunity, lesser evils, medical authority, mental illness (apart from insanity),
military orders (lawful and unlawful), mistake (of law and fact), necessity, official
misstatement of law, parental authority, plea bargained immunity, provocation, public duty or
authority, reflex action, renunciation, self-defense, somnambulism, the spousal defense to
sexual assaults and theft, statute of limitations, subnormality, testimonial immunity, the
unavailable law defense, unconsciousness, and withdrawal.”).
15. See David Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV.
27, 39 (1984).
16. See Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1114 (2015) (arguing that plea bargaining “offers no protection for the innocent”).
17. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79
ALB. L. REV. 919, 939 (2016) (stating that the American legal system, which “makes it in the
interest of defense attorneys as well as prosecutors and judges to convince defendants to plead
guilty,” is “nearly perfectly designed to convict the innocent”).
18. See U.S. District Courts―Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Method of
Disposition, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table5.04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MDU-E92L] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
19. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
20. See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful
Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 835–36 (2010).
My thanks to Michael Risinger for particularly helpful discussions on this point.
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addition, it frequently requires normative judgment21 and, thus, whether a
crime occurred may be unknowable in an objective sense.22 But the inability
to quantify these concerns should not lead to the conclusion that they are
nugatory.23
And yet, legal scholarship often proceeds as if these facets of the system,
and the concern that they should provoke, do not exist.24 Legal scholarship
often seems to present those with convictions as if they can be assumed to be
factually guilty. Thus, one finds explicit statements about the prevalence of
guilt, the reliability of convictions, and the relatively small (or at least
calculable) proportion of convictions that are wrongful.25 One also finds
statements about the criminal system, and those convicted under it, that risk
conveying an implicit message that convictions can be assumed to
correspond to lawbreaking.26

21. See D. Michael Risinger, Searching for Truth in the American Law of Evidence and
Proof, 47 GA. L. REV. 801, 812 (2013) (“[S]ome issues are not, in the end, facts at all but rather
particularized value judgments”); id. at 828–29 (“Take negligence, for one. The conclusion
that an act (or failure to act) was negligent is a value judgment organized around such notions
as ‘reasonable person’ and ‘careful enough.’ If we had a full color, full feel, full smell
hologram of the events alleged to constitute ‘negligence,’ complete with a cap that would
induce experience of the conscious subjective states of the actors from instant to instant, we
would still need some mechanism to make the normative judgment. In such cases the jury
acts, under official delegation and warrant, not only as factfinder but also as the source of
normative judgment.”); id. at 832 (“Most state-of-mind judgments that we expect juries to
make, such as negligence, recklessness, or insanity, carry a more or less explicit normative
warrant.”).
22. As John Mitchell puts it,
[t]here are cases where factual and legal guilt merge. You may know all the facts
in a self-defense case, but whether the defendant was ‘reasonable’ or not in
employing the force he did will be a conclusion of the trier of fact. On the other
hand, whether he was ‘reasonable’ will be central to the question of his factual guilt.
John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney—New Answers to Old
Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 296–98 n.12 (1980); see also Gary Goodpaster, On the
Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 130 (1987)
(“[T]he kind of historical fact with which the law is concerned may not even exist in any
meaningful way independent of the method of proof.”); Shapiro, supra note 15, at 44 (“[S]uch
matters as state of mind are so subjective and ephemeral that it is hard to speak of a reality
distinct from the finding of the trier of fact.”).
23. See Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 47 GONZ.
L. REV. 251, 264 (2011/12) (“Conviction rates are not a valid proxy for commission rates.”);
see also Keith Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 912 (2011/12)
(noting that “[i]f one were asked to start from scratch and devise a system best suited to
ascertaining the truth in criminal cases,” “[i]t is inconceivable that one would create a system
bearing much resemblance to the criminal justice process we now have in the United States”).
24. See Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143,
146 (2011) (“The prospect of error is generally ignored or denied by those entrusted with
governing the criminal justice system, and is not adequately recognized in the scholarly
debate.”).
25. See, e.g., Paul Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate?:
Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom About the Prevalence of Wrongful Convictions, 60
ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 847 (2018) (“To avoid any suggestion of false precision, the wrongful
conviction rate might be stated as a range . . . of 0.016% to 0.062%.”).
26. See infra notes 304–18 and accompanying text.
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One thing that complicates the project of highlighting this issue within
one’s own field is that some of the statements that could be read as taking
factual guilt as a given are made by scholars pushing for much-needed reform
and reframing. So, for example, scholars advance the propositions that all
those with convictions should have a chance at rehabilitation and
redemption,27 that character is not static,28 that poverty is criminogenic,29
and that we need more “lenient” treatment not just of “non-violent drug
offenders”30 but also of “violent offenders”31 and “sex offenders.”32 They
assert that “sex offenders” and “juvenile offenders” should not be subjected
to permanent exile33 and that maybe adult offenders more generally should
not be.34 After all, they say, the “recidivism” rate of “sex offenders”—
viewed as a crucial bit of data—is less “frightening and high” than is often
They emphasize the centrality of the problem of
feared.35
overcriminalization.36 Of the misdemeanor system, they say that it delivers
“assembly-line justice” rather than accurate adjudication.37
Much of this is true, important, and a needed response to the kind of
primitive attitudes that preceded it and survive it.38 And yet, when we speak
27. See, e.g., Regina Austin, “The Shame of It All”: Stigma and the Political
Disenfranchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 173, 180 (2004).
28. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
30. See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 259, 271 (2018) (describing the “non-violent” drug offender as the “poster child” of those
concerned about “overcriminalization” and “overincarceration”).
31. Valuable work has been done, for example, in pointing out that the “violence” required
for something to be classified as a “violent offense” falls considerably short of mainstream
conceptions of “violence.” See, e.g., id. at 313. Even as important points are made about the
messiness, error, and ambiguity in deciding who is which kind of offender, one can sometimes
lose track of similar vulnerabilities in deciding who is an offender in the first place.
32. See, e.g., Guyora Binder & Ben Notterman, Penal Incapacitation: A Situationist
Critique, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 56 (2017).
33. See, e.g., id. (“If Graham and Miller are to be taken seriously, courts and policymakers
may not deliver juvenile offenders into permanent exile without considering the social context
in which they committed their crimes.”); Asmara Tekle-Johnson, In the Zone: Sex Offenders
and the Ten-Percent Solutions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 607, 614 (2009) (asserting “a need for rational
discourse that truly focuses on protecting children and the larger public from dangerous sex
offenders without trampling on the Constitution and common sense in the process”).
34. See Binder & Notterman, supra note 32, at 56 (“Extending the same standard of
decency to adult offenders is the next frontier of Eighth Amendment sentencing
proportionality.”).
35. See Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s
Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 496, 500–05 (2015).
36. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1358 (2012) (stating
that in criminal law, the “traditional story has been destabilized by the overcriminalization
critique”).
37. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 611, 619 (2014) (stating that “[t]he classic criticism of lower courts is that they
delivery ‘assembly-line justice’” (quoting Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the
Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 551, 586 (1997))).
38. See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim
Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 49 n.106 (2012) (“Ronald Reagan provides an example of the
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without complication about “offenders,” their “recidivism,”39 their
redemption, and their rehabilitation; when we emphasize the harms being
wrought by overcriminalization;40 and when we portray character or poverty
as causes of crime, we risk reinforcing the notion that conviction and crime
commission are the same thing. When we wrangle about how severely to
punish different categories of “offenders,” we may seem to take for granted
that all are “offenders” in a factual as well as legal sense. When we
emphasize the extent to which misdemeanor convictions track something
other than factual guilt, we risk suggesting that, in the felony context, we
need not be significantly concerned vis-à-vis the relationship between
conviction and factual guilt.41 And when we speak of those without
convictions as having lived law-abiding lives,42 we risk endorsing a flip-side
assumption that absence of conviction equals factual innocence.
If there is indeed a tendency to fuse legal and factual guilt once convictions
are imposed, it is important to understand why that might be. Some internal
tendencies pushing in that direction may be widely shared. One may yearn
for clarity, simplicity, finality, safety, and to be at peace with the systems in
which one lives.43 To equate crime conviction with crime commission may
serve those desires. Combined with those internal forces are external ones,
such as education and media,44 which reinforce this fusion. From as early as
arrest, the media imparts messages of guilt,45 which by the point of
point of view to which progressives are reacting: ‘Choosing a career in crime is not the result
of poverty or of an unhappy childhood or of a misunderstood adolescence; it’s the result of a
conscious, willful, selfish choice made by some who consider themselves above the law, who
seek to exploit the hard work and, sometimes, the very lives of their fellow citizens.’”).
39. See, e.g., Binder & Notterman, supra note 32, at 41 (“The most important assumption
of penal incapacitation is that past offenders are likely to reoffend.”); Cecelia Klingele,
Measuring Change: From Rates of Recidivism to Markers of Desistance, 109 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 769, 769 (2019) (“Accepting recidivism as a valid, stand-alone metric imposes
on the criminal justice system a responsibility beyond its capacity, demanding that its success
turn on transforming even the most serious and intractable of offenders into fully law-abiding
citizens.”).
40. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1358–59 (describing the overcriminalization critique
and identifying some features that it lacks).
41. See Stephen B. Bright & Sia A. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152 (2013) (“Every day in thousands of
courtrooms across the nation, from top-tier trial courts that handle felony cases to municipal
courts that serve as cash cows for their communities, the right to counsel is violated. Judges
conduct hearings in which poor people accused of crimes and poor children charged with acts
of delinquency appear without lawyers. Many plead guilty without lawyers. Others plead
guilty and are sentenced after learning about plea offers from lawyers they met moments
before and will never see again. Innocent people plead guilty to get out of jail.”); Alice
Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 569 (2018) (noting that
“some critics of misdemeanor jurisprudence hold out felony jurisprudence as a salutary
alternative representing criminal law at its best”).
42. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 990 (2013) (“[Expungement] laws recognize that a person should
not be forever judged and burdened by his or her criminal record. Thus, the laws benefit those
who have demonstrated a commitment to living a law-abiding life.”).
43. See infra notes 336–39 and accompanying text.
44. See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
45. See generally Roberts, supra note 4.
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conviction, are powerful. Even in discussions of “innocence,” it may be that
the high-profile “wrongful conviction,” for all its awfulness, reinforces the
notion that the others are rightful.46 After all, if (as is commonly declared)
convictions involve proof beyond a reasonable doubt,47 and if (as is
commonly declared) our system errs in favor of freeing the innocent,48 there
must not be too much to worry about.
Some additional trends may be felt particularly intensely by those within
legal academia. To be in legal academia is (with exceptions) to have a law
degree, to be successful, and to lack a criminal record.49 Truly to stare at and
acknowledge the inadequacy of defense representation, and fully to
contemplate its implications, might leave those of us who have law licenses,
but who focus on work other than alleviating the representation gap,
uncomfortable.50 There are disincentives, too, to asking provocative
questions about the existing distribution of criminal convictions and the
extent of their accuracy. After all, the status quo has kept us (generally)
successful and conviction-free, despite the assumed prevalence51—some say
universality52—of crime commission.
There are several reasons to be concerned about this potential obscuring
of the extent to which convictions fail to connote crime commission. The
first pertains to the function of legal scholarship. Our role matters in regard
to the criminal system. We are here not to perpetuate state-supported
portrayals of the system but rather to perform and model more complex tasks,
such as questioning binaries and grappling with uncertainty. Additional
reasons relate to the consequences for others. Detecting and responding to

46. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 612 (“Wrongful convictions scholarship and advocacy
is premised on the idea of a rightful conviction.”).
47. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
48. See infra note 410 and accompanying text.
49. See Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from
Social Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 14 (2009) (“The typical path to the law professoriate
is either through legal practice or a series of status markers based on one’s performance as a
law student (good grades and law review, leading to a prestigious judicial clerkship and an
impressive first job).”).
50. See Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses from the Death Penalty: “Old Sparky’s”
Jolt to the Legal Profession, 14 PACE L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (noting lawyers’ role as “guardians
of justice” and arguing that all lawyers should do something to respond to the
disproportionality of resources between the government and the defense in death penalty cases
and the “enormous” professional ethics concerns that are implicated).
51. See Michael J. Coyle, Transgression and Standard Theory: Contributions Toward
Penal Abolition, 26 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 325, 331 (2018) (“[M]ost people habitually
violate the law, and whether on the job, at home or on the street, commit a variety of both
violent and non-violent ‘crimes’ in their lifespan. One counting of such empirical data claims
that in the U.S. more than 90% of all Americans have committed at least one ‘crime’ for which
they could be incarcerated.” (citations omitted)).
52. See Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 491, 498 (2019) (“Everything is a crime, and everyone is a criminal. (Well,
almost.) That has become the refrain among a growing chorus of critics who decry the
phenomenon of ‘overcriminalization.’”); L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion, You Commit Three
Felonies a Day, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2009, 11:09 AM), wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748704471504574438900830760842 [https://perma.cc/9MEV-74MU].
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criminal wrongdoing is a core function of the criminal system.53 If that core
function is failing, to an unknown but potentially large extent, that ought to
be made clear.54 In addition, assumptions that convictions connote crime
commission—and that a lack of convictions bespeaks innocence—are neither
race-neutral nor class-neutral.55 Convictions are disproportionately imposed
on poor people and people of color.56 Thus, assumptions that convictions
correspond to factual guilt risk compounding the stereotyping of people of
color and poor people as lawbreakers,57 including assumptions of their
dangerousness.58 Meanwhile, whites benefit disproportionately from the
flip-side assumption, thus becoming the beneficiaries of still more “White
credit.”59 Finally, if those who are assumed to have committed crimes lose
some portion of the empathy that they might otherwise inspire,60 assumptions
that convictions connote crime commission risk lessening concern in a
number of important reform areas, such as jail and prison conditions,
sentencing, and other consequences of conviction.
So, this Article suggests that even as important claims are made about the
need for reform initiatives, such as nonpunitive approaches, care should be
taken to combine them with reminders that, in some unknown but potentially
large number of cases, there is nothing to punish. Such efforts not to erase
the system’s fallibility can take the form of explicit caveats; they can also
53. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, DNA Exonerations and the Elusive Promise of Criminal
Justice Reform, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 271, 277 (2017) (“[O]ur criminal justice system exists
in order to sort the guilty from the innocent.”).
54. See George C. Thomas III, History’s Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 543, 546 (“How many times is an innocent defendant convicted? No one knows because
we have no independent method for determining who is innocent other than the very small
number of almost random successful DNA claims made after a conviction has become final.”).
55. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1365 (“[N]ot only do bulk arrest practices discriminate
against minorities, they potentially fill the system with innocent people of color who are then
wrongly labeled ‘criminal.’ . . . [This] dynamic is an important ingredient in the racialization
of crime.”).
56. See Janet Moore et al., Privileging Public Defense Research, 69 MERCER L. REV. 771,
773 (2018).
57. See Kenneth L. Karst, Local Discourse and the Social Issues, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L.
& LITERATURE 1, 18 (2000) (stating that the most typical middle-class assumptions about race
and ethnicity “associate poverty with a black or brown face, with crime, with immorality . . .
and with a preference for handouts over work”); Justin Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit
Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190
(2010) (explaining that mock jurors held “strong associations between Black and Guilty,
relative to White and Guilty, and [that] these implicit associations predicted the way mock
jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence”).
58. See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497,
509–10 (2012).
59. Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of
the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 527 (2009) (“When Blacks are
unfairly ‘taxed’ in the criminal system with perceived criminality, Whites receive an
undeserved ‘credit’ with a perceived innocence or worthiness of redemption.”).
60. Radley Balko, Opinion, The Case for Releasing Violent Offenders, WASH. POST (Aug.
14, 2017, 11:23 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/08/14/thecase-for-releasing-violent-offenders/ [https://perma.cc/DQX2-665U] (“We want to punish
criminals. We want them to suffer. We create hostile prison environments rife with violence,
racial resentment and rape.”).
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take the form of increased care with terms such as “felon,” “criminal,” and
“offender” that, along with their other downsides, risk merging legal guilt
with factual guilt. Finally, they can involve efforts to ensure that neither
definitions of words like “innocence” and “wrongful conviction”61 nor
attempts to quantify those phenomena contribute to an overly narrow view
of innocence. To point out the problem of assuming the guilt of those who
may not be guilty is not to endorse any of the extant consequences for those
who are both legally and factually guilty. But recognizing both the flawed
nature of the system and our tendencies to make it seem otherwise is an
important part of figuring out how to respond to the flaws.
Part I will address the predominance of the plea and the subordination of
the defense. It will explain their potential—alongside a host of other
factors—to leave us uncertain but concerned about the prevalence of
convictions imposed in the absence of factual guilt. Part II will describe a
variety of ways in which legal scholarship often tends, either explicitly or
implicitly, toward a portrayal of convictions as things that generally connote
crime commission. Part III will explore potential causes of this apparent
fusion of legal and factual guilt. Part IV will explore implications of fusing
legal and factual guilt, explaining first why this fusion matters and, second,
what might be done to address the situation.
I. FACTORS JEOPARDIZING THE RELIABILITY OF CONVICTIONS
This Part will examine two factors whose analysis within legal scholarship
reveals their potential to contribute to the phenomenon of convictions
detached from factual guilt. These factors—the predominance of the plea
and the subordination of the defense—are chosen in part because of their
widespread applicability and in part to counteract the tendency to think of
innocence narrowly, as involving only “wrong man” scenarios,62 and thus
perhaps to think that innocence concerns cluster solely around those factors
identified by the Innocence Project as the leading contributors to “wrongful
convictions”: things like eyewitness misidentification, improper forensics,
and so on.63 For all that the recognition of “innocence” among those with
convictions has been an important contributor to reform,64 the way in which
it is sometimes framed runs the risk of suggesting that those who are factually

61. See, e.g., Lillquist, supra note 12, at 184 (“When most of us think about wrongful
convictions, we are primarily concerned with cases involving incorrect identifications. These
are cases where the claim is ‘I did not do the crime’ rather than ‘no crime was committed.’
But even in cases in which we are certain that we have the right person, there can still be good
reason to believe that the system was wrong about the defendant’s culpability for the acts the
defendant committed.”).
62. Samuel Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 190 (2008)
(“Inevitably, our image of false convictions is formed by the cases we know . . . .”).
63. See
The
Causes
of
Wrongful
Conviction,
INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction./
[https://perma.cc/NF7ETM7A] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
64. Simon, supra note 24, at 145.
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innocent but convicted are a group of relatively small size affected by a
discrete set of factors. This Article hopes to unsettle that notion.
A. The Predominance of Plea Bargaining
There is a reason that up to 97 percent of convictions are the product of
guilty pleas.65 Indeed, there are many reasons. Plea offers are designed to
be so appealing that you would throw a bunch of constitutional rights out the
window66 and admit that you committed a crime, even while knowing that
punishment will follow. Their appeal is not limited in its effect to “the
guilty.”67 As this section will explain, trial is always a gamble; several
factors mar the chances even of “the innocent”; the risks attending loss at
trial are significant; and what a plea bargain offers is a relatively certain
sentencing outcome and one that potentially avoids some of the worst aspects
of loss at trial (and indeed, some of the worst aspects of pretrial hardship).
Nor is it the case that existing safeguards prevent guilty pleas from being
entered in the absence of guilt.
1. Chances at Trial
If those who are factually innocent felt that their chances of being found
not guilty at trial were sufficiently good, this would of course reduce the
desirability of guilty pleas. But the risks of trial are plentiful, even for those
who are factually innocent.
Aspects of the jury process contribute to the risk of convictions in the
absence of factual guilt. Subordinated groups are vulnerable to exclusion
from criminal juries just as they are vulnerable to criminal charges.68 A
dynamic where those from an “in-group” sit in judgment of an “out-group”
member fosters bias,69 and bias can influence determinations of guilt.70 That
white jurors are viewed by at least some accused people as embodiments of
bias as opposed to neutral fact finders is illustrated by the use of the white
jury as a tool to persuade suspects to confess.71

65. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
66. See Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness, supra note 3, at 1545.
67. See Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 476 (1980) (stating
that “plea bargaining may actually function perversely, placing the greatest pressure on
defendants who are factually innocent”); id. at 477 (noting that “the rational choice may well
be to enter a guilty plea despite factual innocence”); id. at 497 (mentioning “the fact that plea
bargaining systematically undercuts the factual reliability of criminal judgments”).
68. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-trial World, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 2173, 2189–90 (2014) (mentioning exclusion from juries of people of color, people
with felony convictions, poor people, and homeless people).
69. Roberts, supra note 2, at 866–67.
70. Levinson et al., supra note 57, at 207.
71. See Andrew Cohen, Confessing While Black: When the Threat of a White Jury Is an
Interrogation
Tool,
MARSHALL PROJECT
(Dec.
12,
2014,
8:37
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/12/confessing-while-black
[https://perma.cc/
T77N-ELSZ].
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Nor can jury instructions cure the most troubling tendencies of jurors.
Jurors may fail to understand instructions,72 they may be unable to comply
with them,73 and they may consciously override them.74 The presumption
that juries follow instructions is, as Alex Kozinski puts it, “more of a
guess.”75 This goes for even the most fundamental instruction—the one that
telegraphs how much is being done to ward off wrongful convictions—
namely the instruction not to convict where any reasonable doubt exists.76
Similarly, the instruction that jurors should presume innocence until all the
evidence is heard fails to serve its purpose.77 Jurors have of course convicted
many people who were later deemed “innocent” in the narrow, wrong-man
sense,78 and if one expands one’s view of innocence to encompass those who,
for example, lacked the mens rea required by the crime or were not guilty
because some other defense applied, one finds additional indications of
juries’ vulnerability. Jody Armour has identified mens rea deliberations as a
hotbed of juror bias.79 With regard to defenses, as will be explained,80 they
play an undervalued role in cultural understandings of what crime is. There
is reason to be concerned that they may also be undervalued by laypersons
plucked off the streets to serve as jurors.
Maybe one would worry less about the fact finders in one’s case if one had
a broader sense of trust in the ability of the legal system to demonstrate the
kind of qualities that seem necessary for a fair and accurate trial: things like
an interest in protecting the individual from unfairness; an awareness of what
is at stake for the individual; openness to the fact that the individual might be
innocent (and indeed is presumed innocent); effective and well-informed
advocacy from the individual’s representative; an interest in accuracy; and a
willingness to listen to what the individual has to say. But up until the point
72. Dan Simon, More Problems with Criminal Trials: The Limited Effectiveness of Legal
Mechanisms, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2012, at 167, 174–75 (explaining that
comprehension rates range from 13 to 73 percent).
73. See, e.g., Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the
Defendant’s Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 738
(“[I]t cannot be assumed that jurors will follow an instruction on the use of evidence of
previous convictions.”).
74. See Lillquist, supra note 12, at 184–85 (mentioning, in connection with the risk of
wrongful conviction, a concern that jury instructions are unhelpful and sometimes worsen the
situation).
75. Alex Kozinski, Preface, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., at iii,
viii (2015).
76. See Vida B. Johnson, Presumed Fair?: Voir Dire on the Fundamentals of Our
Criminal Justice System, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 545, 557 (2015).
77. See id.
78. For examples, see NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/VR7Z-SKLE] (last visited Apr. 12,
2020) (currently detailing 2572 exonerations).
79. See Jody Armour, Where Bias Lives in the Criminal Law and Its Processes: How
Judges and Jurors Socially Construct Black Criminals, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 217 (2018)
(“Only through radically overhauling the prevailing mens rea paradigm can we shed light on
the enormous number of opportunities that exist in criminal trials for jurors’ racially biased
moral judgments to result in the biased social construction of black criminals.”).
80. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
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at which a defendant must decide whether she will take a chance on the
possibility of a fair and accurate adjudication, if, like a disproportionate
number of those who are prosecuted in this country, she is poor and a person
of color,81 it is unlikely that she has experienced any of those things from the
government authorities,82 including the law enforcement authorities,83 with
whom she has interacted. For example, the lives of those who are poor
(including, and perhaps particularly, those who have been directly impacted
by the criminal system) are not imbued with signals that the government
cares vis-à-vis them about respect,84 accuracy,85 their stories,86 their
protection,87 their presumptive innocence,88 or the stakes for them of
governmental action.89 If their stance by the time of their plea decision is

81. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
82. See Shelley C. Chapman, I’m a Judge and I Think Criminal Court Is Horrifying,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 11, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2016/08/11/i-m-a-judge-and-i-think-criminal-court-is-horrifying
[https://perma.cc/4DKT4UFS] (“I was shocked at the casual racism emanating from the bench. The judge explained
a ‘stay away’ order to a Hispanic defendant by saying that if the complainant calls and invites
you over for ‘rice and beans,’ you cannot go. She lectured some defendants that most young
men ‘with names like yours’ have lengthy criminal records by the time they reach a certain
age.”).
83. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126
YALE L.J. 2054, 2125 (2017) (suggesting that “incentives to arrest might . . . bring more people
into contact with aggressive policing” and that “[e]ven if those people are never arrested, and
even if they do not become suspects of any particular crime, this contact might have negative
effects on their perceptions of police, reminding them of their relative worthlessness in the
eyes of the state”).
84. See M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301, 339 (2018); Sarah Lustbader
& Vaidya Gullapalli, The Waiting Game: NYPD Ripped 1-Year-Old from Mother, but Why
Did the Benefits Office Expect Her to Wait for Hours, Standing Up, with a Child?, APPEAL
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-waiting-game-nypd-ripped-1-year-old-frommother-but-why-did-the-benefits-office-expect-her-to-wait-for-hours-standing-up-with-achild/ [https://perma.cc/E7VC-Q9XU] (“In courtrooms, jails, and benefits offices around the
country, low-income people are told to wait. For hours. They are not told to return in an hour,
or that someone will call them when it’s their turn, or to take a seat, have a cup of water, and
read a book. In criminal court, defendants and their families are often forced to wait for hours.
They must do so silently, and are not allowed to read a newspaper, let alone check their phone.
There is simply no regard for their time.”).
85. See MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 10 (1979) (“There was little independent investigation of facts.”).
86. See Hanan, supra note 84, at 339 (mentioning “‘a court culture of indifference,
disrespect, and hostility’ toward criminal defendants” (quoting Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve,
CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA'S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 55
(2016))); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1449, 1456–57 (2005).
87. See Cecelia Trenticosta & William C. Collins, Death and Dixie: How the Courthouse
Confederate Flag Influences Capital Cases in Louisiana, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC
JUST. 125, 138 (2011).
88. See FEELEY, supra note 85, at 9 (mentioning “court-oriented criminal justice with
its . . . assumption that riffraff are probably guilty”).
89. See id. at 3 (“[Lower criminal courts] are chaotic and confusing; officials
communicate in a verbal shorthand wholly unintelligible to accused and accuser alike, and
they seem to make arbitrary decisions, sending one person to jail and freeing the next.”).
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one of legal estrangement,90 it would not be a surprise. It would also be
unsurprising if, instead of leaving their fate in the hands of a combination of
some or all of judge, prosecutor, government-funded attorney, and jurors,
they chose to act as their own condemner.
Then there is the fact that the government is not just the overseer of the
process but also the adversary. As discussed in the next section, defendants’
resources are usually significantly inferior to those of the government,91 in
areas that include legal representation,92 investigation,93 and the ability to
locate and compel witnesses.94 While defendants do have access to
something that the government does not—their ability to testify—they are all
too easily damned if they do and damned if they don’t.95 Defendants who
testify at trial are vulnerable to attacks of all sorts: they may lack the
education, testimonial training, and jury appeal that the government’s
witnesses have,96 and they may be vulnerable to scathing cross90. See Bell, supra note 83, at 2125; Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, New Sheriff; Old
Problems: Advancing Access to Justice Under the Trump Administration, 127 YALE L.J.
FORUM 254, 262 (2017) (“The demographics of those who mistrust government,
unsurprisingly, correspond to those most affected by the justice gap—those living in poverty,
people of color, women, immigrants, the elderly, people with disabilities, and LGBT
individuals.”).
91. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 33 (1997).
92. See George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Claims of Innocence?:
Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 273 (2003) (“If many
innocent suspects do not meet their lawyer until he arrives with a plea bargain in hand, . . .
some might be tempted to take the offer. After all, if you are innocent, it would not inspire
much confidence in your lawyer if you meet him for the first time only when he has already
assumed your guilt and bargained a jail sentence for you.”).
93. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1360, 1375–76 (“Defense counsel has far fewer
resources and less access to incriminating witnesses than the prosecution. When representing
an indigent, defense counsel needs the permission of the court to expend any monies on
investigators or experts. While the defendant has a right to subpoena witnesses, enforcing
those subpoenas frequently requires the active participation of the police or court officers.
Thus, defense counsel must depend frequently upon the goodwill of the state or the judge.”);
Simon, supra note 72, at 172 (“The vast majority of criminal defendants lack the resources,
expertise, and legal authority to investigate crimes effectively.”); David Alan Sklansky,
Autonomy and Agency in American Criminal Process 18 (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper
No.
2849226,
2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2849226
[https://perma.cc/DPQ3-GN6E] (“In a criminal case, though, the parties have vastly different
investigatory resources. The prosecution has the police; the defense does not . . . . Lawyers
representing indigent defendants, in particular, often lack the means to conduct any kind of
independent investigation.”).
94. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1375–76.
95. See, e.g., Alan Hornstein, Between Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and
Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1997) (“When [a hypothetical
person who is poor, African-American and from the inner city] is arrested and charged the
third time, he is more likely to face imprisonment. At that point, [he] may wish to plead ‘not
guilty’ and go to trial. If he does so, he will have two choices: (1) He may elect to testify and
deny his guilt, in which case his prior convictions may be used to impeach and he will likely
be convicted; or (2) He may elect to forego his right to testify in order to prevent his prior
convictions from coming before the jury, in which case he is likely to be convicted.” (footnotes
omitted)).
96. See Simon, supra note 72, at 171 (mentioning “the credibility advantage that police
officers enjoy over criminal defendants”); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism,
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examination97 on subjects such as criminal records.98 Whereas impeachment
of a defendant with her prior convictions is supposed to be done only for the
purpose of attacking her truthfulness as a witness, such impeachment has the
effect, and some would say the purpose, of encouraging propensity-based
reasoning.99 If defendants instead take the path of remaining silent, they get
punished by jurors who want to hear both sides of the story.100 One study of
exonerees revealed that the most common reason for their waivers of the right
to testify was their fear that their prior convictions would be used to crush
them. While this fear was well-founded,101 from their silence followed their
conviction.102
2. Risks After Trial
Paired with the risks that trial will end in a guilty verdict are the risks of
what that might entail.103 Of course there is the sentence, frequently inflated
beyond what was offered pretrial, thanks to the “trial penalty.”104 The desire
to lessen sentencing exposure is a huge driver of guilty pleas105 and does not

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1080 (2013) (mentioning that “most of the criminal justice
population is poor, undereducated, suffering from substance abuse and/or mental health
challenges, and thus in a poor position to understand their legal options or advocate for
themselves”).
97. See PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 89 (2009).
98. John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—
Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 489 (2008).
99. See id.; see also Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 289, 296 (2008) (“Scholarly commentary in the modern era has resolutely derided
prior conviction impeachment as a mean-spirited penalty imposed on criminal defendants—
nothing more than a thinly veiled effort by prosecutors (condoned by ‘law and order’ courts
and legislators) to introduce otherwise prohibited evidence of a defendant’s criminal
propensities through the back door of credibility impeachment.”).
100. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1369.
101. See Blume, supra note 98, at 493 (stating that his data “confirm[ed] that threatening a
defendant with the introduction of his or her prior record contributes to wrongful convictions
either directly—in cases in where the defendant is impeached with the prior record and the
jury draws the propensity inference—or indirectly—by keeping the defendant off the stand.”).
102. See id.
103. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV.
207, 226 (2013) (“For all but the simplest crimes, prosecutors can pile up charges to the point
where the incentive to plea bargain becomes overwhelming.”).
104. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT
(2018), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/thetrial-penalty-the-sixth-amendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-tosave-it.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5Q9-PPMX]. Note also the slimness of the protection against
vindictive prosecution. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978)
(finding no constitutional violation where the rejection of a plea offer of five years in prison
was followed by the invocation of a “recidivist” statute threatening a life sentence).
105. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 279 (saying of the innocent defendant who is at risk of
a five-year prison term that “[i]f she estimates that she has an 80% chance of acquittal at trial,
she should accept any plea bargain that offers her less than one year in prison”).
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dissolve in the presence of innocence.106 The threat of mandatory minimum
sentences, for example, may provoke guilty pleas even by those who are not
factually guilty.107
There are also myriad consequences other than the formal sentence that
can contribute to the relative desirability of a guilty plea, even when someone
is innocent. The question of which “collateral consequences” will attach to
a guilty plea is a powerful ingredient of plea bargaining,108 including
consequences relating to one’s immigration status,109 ability to work,110 and
presence on a state “offender” registry.111 Prosecutors have enormous
leverage, thanks in part to a wide variety of qualitatively different
experiences that they can offer: a life sentence instead of death,112 a
misdemeanor conviction instead of a felony conviction,113 no incarceration
instead of incarceration,114 a disposition that will not get you deported,115
one that will get you drug treatment,116 one that will spare a loved one from
prosecution,117 or one that will not require you to register as a “sex offender”
for the rest of your life.118 Buried among the array of prosecutorial tools is
likely to be one that can make you buckle.119
3. Risks Before Trial
For many people (guilty or not), it is the risks posed pre-adjudication, such
as pretrial detention, that provide the most immediate incentive to accept a

106. See Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: Plea-Bargaining’s Innocence Problem and
the Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 84–86 (asserting that “it is clear that pleabargaining has an innocence problem” and surveying estimates).
107. See Paul Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J.
2176, 2184 (2013) (“Prosecutors, using the legal apparatus of expansive criminal liability,
recidivist statutes, and mandatory minimums, coerce guilty pleas by threatening defendants
with vastly disproportionate punishment if they go to trial.”).
108. See Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901, 905–14
(2017).
109. See Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953,
960–61 (2018).
110. See id.
111. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence,
and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2009).
112. See Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions,
48 CRIM. L. BULL. 221, 234 (2012).
113. Ristroph, supra note 41, at 597.
114. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1346.
115. See Jain, supra note 109, at 960–61.
116. See John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance,
Limited Legislative Options, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 218 (2015).
117. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 143, 157 (2011) (describing “wired” pleas).
118. See Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 856 (2019) (“There are many
reasons the defense attorney wants to avoid registration, but the most important one is that
being on the sex offender registry will exclude the defendant from shelters, group homes, and
public housing.”).
119. Daniel Richman, Framing the Prosecution, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 679 (2014).
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plea.120 Indeed, Jocelyn Simonson has suggested that it is the setting of bail
that serves as our most important adjudicative moment.121 A guilty plea can
often shorten the duration of one’s confinement122 and thus can offer the
prospect of not just liberty but all that liberty can permit: life with loved
ones123 and other potential ingredients of a sustainable life.124 Pleading
guilty can also lead to the possibility of what John Blume calls “a less
restrictive custodial environment”125 by getting you out of the local jails,
where conditions may be horrendous.126 In addition, pretrial confinement
limits or destroys one’s ability to aid in the preparation of one’s defense127—
particularly if one’s lawyer never visits128—thus making any nonplea option
seem still less viable.129
Nor are the pressures to end a case—guilt or no guilt—confined to those
in custody. Court appearances are generally scheduled in disregard for—and
perhaps in an eagerness to disregard130—a defendant’s other
commitments.131 Assigned with hundreds of others to a courtroom docket,
one may have to wait all day, only to be instructed to return on another day132
120. See Gross, supra note 10, at 776 (saying of a group of exonerees who pled guilty, that
most appear to have done so “to get out of jail”); Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Aug.
13,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html
[https://perma.cc/6AJK-9UGP] (citing data in support of the conclusion that “bail makes poor
people who would otherwise win their cases plead guilty”).
121. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 585 (2017) (“[F]or
indigent defendants, [bail] often serves the function that a real trial might, producing guilty
pleas and longer sentences when an individual cannot afford to pay their bail.”).
122. For a discussion of the paltry nature of speedy trial protections, see Roberts, supra
note 4.
123. See Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-thejustice-system.html [https://perma.cc/YD6Q-EZV2] (“As a mother myself, I do not think
there’s anything I wouldn’t plead guilty to if a prosecutor told me that accepting a plea was
the only way to get home to my children.”).
124. See Natapoff, supra note 96, at 1051 (“Innocent defendants may plead guilty because
they cannot afford bail pending trial and will lose jobs, homes, or children by remaining
incarcerated, or they may plead because the trial penalty is too great relative to the plea
offer.”).
125. See Blume, supra note 98, at 496 n.70 (“There are many reasons to question whether
many defendants are in fact guilty of the underlying offense [to which they plead guilty]. For
example, due to jail overcrowding and large criminal dockets in major metropolitan areas,
many defendants plead guilty in order to obtain their immediate release or to get to a less
restrictive custodial environment rather than spending a substantial amount of time in a local
jail awaiting a trial date.”).
126. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV.
837, 877 (2018) (“As a general matter, conditions in jails are much worse than prisons
nationwide . . . .”).
127. See Verified Petition for Class Certification & Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2–
4, Allen v. Edwards, No. 655079 (La. Dist. Ct. Feb. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Verified Petition].
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See FEELEY, supra note 85, at 276–77.
131. Id. at 272–75.
132. See Jain, supra note 109, at 959–60 (“Misdemeanor courts are too often plagued by
delays, meaning that defendants who want their day in court face repeated postponements.
The upshot of all this is that many defendants choose to waive their right to counsel and plead
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and once again put in jeopardy one’s ability to be a parent, caregiver, worker,
student, or patient.133 Unless, that is, one decides to end the case via plea.134
4. Lack of Safeguards
One could perhaps counteract these pressures if one set up meaningful
safeguards against the entering of guilty pleas in the absence of factual guilt.
But such safeguards are lacking, a fact that is unsurprising given the
incentives on the part of all the repeat players—courts, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys—to resolve a large number of cases via plea.135
Naturally, defendants are themselves potential safeguards: they can refuse
to plead guilty if it is unacceptable to them to admit guilt.136 One should
remember, however, that the criminal law is a complex, inaccessible thing.
There is a colloquial sense of what crimes are137—murders are killing people,
for example138—and then there are the nuances, where you can kill without
committing a murder,139 and even without committing a crime,140 depending
on things that help define what is and is not a crime, such as mens rea and
affirmative defenses.141 If we acknowledge that crime commission is a
complex thing resting on the resolution of a variety of legal, factual, and
normative questions, it is easier to see that defendants may not know whether
they have committed a crime,142 particularly if they lack well-resourced
counsel to investigate and advise. They may know they were there; they may
know they did something; they may know that in the colloquial sense that’s
guilty as quickly as possible.”); David Feige, Opinion, Waiting and Waiting . . . for Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/opinion/waiting-andwaiting-for-justice.html [https://perma.cc/2MER-QEHJ].
133. See Jenny Roberts, The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors, 98 B.U. L. REV.
779, 833 (2018) (“[M]any people—including innocent people—accept plea offers even when
out of jail, to avoid coming back to court (and thus losing work days and possibly their jobs).”).
134. See id.
135. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79
ALB. L. REV. 919, 939 (2015/2016) (stating that the American legal system, which “makes it
in the interest of defense attorneys as well as prosecutors and judges to convince defendants
to plead guilty” is “nearly perfectly designed to convict the innocent”); Albert W. Alschuler,
The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 714 (1981).
136. See Symposium, Stealing Innocence: Juvenile Legal Issues and the Innocence
Project, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 577, 586 (2012).
137. See Simon, supra note 72, at 176.
138. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1017 (describing the phenomenon whereby homicides
are routinely described as “murders” in accordance with a colloquial sense of what crime is).
139. This is the case, for example, with manslaughter. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, The
Rise and Fall of Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 351, 424 (2005).
140. This is the case, for example, with a killing carried out in self-defense. See Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 451 (2008).
141. Note that the constitutional requirement regarding pre-plea advice relating to the
components of a crime is limited to elements rather than defenses. See Shapiro, supra note 15,
at 37 (“[A] plea of guilty, to be invulnerable to direct or collateral constitutional attack, must
be knowingly and voluntarily made. This standard requires the defendant to be informed of
the essential elements of the crime as well as of certain constitutional rights.”).
142. See Brandon L. Garrett, Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1415, 1431 (2016) (reasons for pleading include “misunderstanding what is required by
the elements of the offenses” and “misunderstanding what intent is required”).
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on the way, or all the way, to crime. But in the nuanced sense of whether,
under the law, a crime occurred, that question—if even answerable143—
requires not just factual but also legal know-how, so defendants cannot
always act as their own safeguards.
This brings us to defense attorneys. Of course, all across this country there
are zealous attorneys who are made queasy by repeatedly entering guilty
pleas, perhaps particularly when they detect innocence,144 and who fight their
hardest to prevent guilty pleas being taken by those who are innocent. But
there are also defense attorneys who are inclined to assume guilt145 and who
may, as a result, resist guilty pleas with something less than alacrity.146 Even
absent attorneys’ assumptions of guilt, there are resource deficiencies that
may mean that defense attorneys are unable to conduct a rigorous screening
for guilt147 or that they confront the prospect that they would be outgunned
at trial and therefore conclude that a guilty plea is the best option for their
client148—even where they detect innocence. And in thousands of guilty plea
proceedings, there are no defense attorneys at all.149
The prosecutorial duty to do justice includes a duty to avoid the conviction
of the innocent.150 But prosecutors have only limited access to evidence
143. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
144. See M. Chris Fabricant, Rousting the Cops, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 30, 2007),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2007/10/30/rousting-the-cops/
[https://perma.cc/DYC4CXHY] (“[W]ell over half of my cases are misdemeanors, and I have had a disgraceful number
of innocent clients, many of whom plead guilty . . . .”).
145. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE, at xiv (1982) (“Any criminal lawyer
who tells you that most of his clients are not guilty is either bluffing or deliberately limiting
his practice to a few innocent defendants.”); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications:
Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1269 n.121 (1993)
(“[T]here is evidence that public defenders and criminal defense lawyers themselves believe
that the vast majority of their clients are guilty of some wrongdoing.”); David Grann, Trial by
Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), http://
www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann [https://perma.cc/YYP262AD] (quoting the attorney for Cameron Todd Willingham, who may have been wrongly
executed for murdering his three children, as saying, “[e]veryone thinks defense lawyers must
believe their clients are innocent, but that’s seldom true . . . . Most of the time, they’re guilty
as sin”).
146. Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing
Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 327 (2009).
147. See Myrna S. Raeder et al., Convicting the Guilty, Acquitting the Innocent: Recently
Adopted ABA Policies, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2006, at 14, 19 (“Although prosecutors’ offices
are themselves underfunded, the situation is still worse for defense counsel, and the resulting
disparities make it particularly hard for them to uncover the sorts of unintentional errors,
omissions, and biases that can result in mistaken convictions.”).
148. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1170–71 (2008).
149. See Hughes, supra note 11, at 1113–14 (explaining how pro se defendants are
particularly dependent on courts to tell them “that by pleading guilty they risk overlooking a
viable defense and/or the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether it is wise
to plead guilty, [because] once the plea is final, it is exceedingly difficult to ‘undo’ the
conviction through post-conviction litigation” and that, despite this, the Supreme Court has
ruled that courts have no constitutional obligation to provide such information).
150. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 634 (1999) (mentioning the objective of “avoiding punishment of those who are innocent
of criminal wrongdoing”).
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relating to mens rea or potential affirmative defenses.151 In addition, office
incentives tend to reward convictions.152 Finally, tunnel vision may increase
the extent to which prosecutors are inclined to assume guilt and to discount
information that is in tension with that assumption.153
Then there is the judge and the law that she interprets. There, too, the
protections against pleas being allowed in the absence of factual guilt can be
thin, whether one focuses on the trial level or the appellate stages.154 At trial,
the burden of proof that fact finders are instructed to apply is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, which is a standard justified in terms of its potential to
prevent the conviction of those who are innocent.155 But when it comes to
evaluating the basis for a plea, the standard appears to be one at the other end
of the criminal justice spectrum: probable cause,156 a standard that has been
described as requiring “less than a fifty-fifty chance of guilt”157 and, indeed,
“little more than heightened suspicion.”158 While many states require a
guilty plea to have a “factual basis,”159 legal scholars have exposed the
thinness of this requirement.160

151. Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for
False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126, 149 (2013) (pointing out that prosecutors
“don’t always see all of the evidence” and may miss “refuting evidence”).
152. See id. at 148 (“[P]rosecutor performance is often measured by conviction rates.”).
153. Id. at 149.
154. See Samuel Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are
Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230, 7230 (2014) (“Few [felony guilty
pleas] are ever subject to any review whatsoever. . . . [T]he appeals that do take place are
usually perfunctory and unrelated to guilt or innocence.”).
155. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free.”).
156. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 43–44.
157. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1349 (“[A]n innocent person can be legally arrested,
sail through the weak screening processes of the prosecutorial and public defender offices, go
to jail, and succumb to the pressure to plead guilty, all based on no more than a probability
(less than a fifty-fifty chance) of guilt.”).
158. See Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1412, 1413–14 (2003) (“The plea bargaining system effectively substitutes a concept of
partial guilt for the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is marvelously
designed to secure conviction of the innocent.”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion
in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 680–81 (“Probable cause is little more than
heightened suspicion, and it is not even remotely sufficient to screen out individuals who are
factually not guilty.”).
159. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(f) (4th ed. 2017).
160. See Bowers, supra note 148, at 1170–71 (“Courts have allowed defendants to plead
guilty to daytime burglaries to satisfy lesser charges, even when the crimes indisputably
occurred in dark of night. Courts have upheld pleas to ‘hypothetical crimes’ that exist in no
penal code and require impossible mens rea.” (footnote omitted)); Jacqueline E. Ross, The
Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L.
717, 721 (2006); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 212–13 (2006) (noting that “[a]t present, the
factual basis inquiry into the plea is often perfunctory”).
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Many judges will accept a guilty plea only if an admission of guilt is made,
but this can again be a charade rather than an effective screen.161 And indeed
in most states, an Alford plea is permitted162—a guilty plea nestled inside
which is the defendant’s assertion of innocence—thus perhaps laying bare
the minimal extent to which, for a guilty plea, guilt needs to be clear.163 Nor
is this necessarily wrong in the system that exists. Professor Josh Bowers
argues that it is precisely right.164 What incentivizes judges to accept pleas
even in these wobbly circumstances may be not just the pragmatic desire to
move things along, or a tendency to assume the guilt of defendants, but a
recognition that accuracy may need to be sacrificed in order to prevent
grossly excessive exposure to punishment or other consequences.165 Truth
is a luxury that not everyone can afford.166
Thus, the kinds of screens that one might hope would be in place to prevent
guilty pleas in the absence of factual guilt—those applied by defendants,
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges—are often minimal.167 And such
screens tend to be still more minimal on appellate review,168 as this Article
further explores in Part I.C.169 If we examine the National Registry of
Exonerations,170 we find numerous examples of those who pled guilty,171
and scholars such as Professor Samuel Gross have suggested that guilty pleas
might mask the innocence of a huge other group of people.172 Nor should
161. See Garrett, supra note 142, at 1421 (“Judges may ask a defendant to provide an
‘allocution’ before pleading guilty, but the admission of guilt need not be under oath or very
detailed, and it may just involve an in-court agreement that the defendant committed acts
satisfying the legal elements of the crime.”); see also id. at 1427 (“An admission to having
satisfied the elements of the crime . . . does not reach the question of whether any defenses
might defeat criminal liability.”); id. at 1421 (“[T]he defendant may say little or nothing at all
of any substance . . . [and] some courts even tolerate plea bargains en masse . . . .”).
162. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1372
n.52 (2003) (forty-seven states and the District of Columbia).
163. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1970).
164. See Bowers, supra note 148, at 1123–24.
165. See Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 344–46 (2017)
(describing judicial dismissals motivated by these reasons).
166. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 279 (“Plea bargaining puts a price tag on sorting the
innocent from the guilty, and it makes that price too high for most defendants.”).
167. So too with grand juries. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 597 (noting that “a slight
majority of states do not require grand juries to review felony charges, and where grand jury
proceedings persist, they have been structured to favor the prosecutor and rarely fail to deliver
indictment”).
168. See Gross, supra note 10, at 777.
169. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 133, at 783–84 (“There is general consensus that
documented exonerations in serious felony cases are only the ‘tip of the [wrongful conviction]
iceberg.’” (quoting Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 531 (2005))).
171. See Colin Miller, Why States Must Consider Innocence Claims After Guilty Pleas, 10
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 671, 673 (2020) (stating that “74 out of 166 (44.6%) DNA and non-DNA
exonerees in 2016 were individuals who had been convicted after guilty pleas”).
172. See Samuel Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction:
Why We Know so Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927,
930–31 (2008) (“[I]t is entirely possible that most wrongful convictions—like 90 percent or
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any of this be taken as suggesting that trial is a panacea.173 After all, in many
instances it is a well-justified fear of the fallibilities of trial that helps to impel
pleas—all the features of trials laid out above174—and indeed the bulk of
cases contained within the exonerations registry involved convictions at
trial.175
B. The Subordination of the Defense
Defense representation is vitally important as a means of protecting
defendants’ rights176 and warding off convictions.177 Defense attorneys have
an array of means by which they can reduce the risk of conviction in the
absence of factual guilt.178 They can, for example, communicate skillfully
with their clients, obtaining information and dissuading guilty pleas, whether
through expressing or displaying the reasons to hold firm. They can also
advocate for pre-adjudication release and other pretrial conditions that will
permit a client both to withstand the pressures to plead guilty and to assist
with trial preparation.179 In addition, they can locate and talk to witnesses
with the help of investigators;180 obtain and deploy knowledge of the
more of all criminal convictions—are based on negotiated guilty pleas to comparatively light
charges, and that the innocent defendants in those cases received little or no time in custody.
If so, it may well be that a major cause of these comparatively low-level miscarriages of justice
is the prospect of prolonged pretrial detention of innocent defendants who are unable to post
bail.”).
173. See Gerard Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2123 (1998) (pointing out the problems that exist for the “poor and ill-represented”
at trial, including disparate resources and juror prejudice); Simon, supra note 24, at 222
(“[T]he adjudicative process falls short of reliably distinguishing between guilty and innocent
defendants.”).
174. See supra notes 67–101 and accompanying text.
175. Approximately 55 percent of the 2016 exonerations, for example. See NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2016, at 7 (2017), http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9QJ-VJZA].
176. See James Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?:
The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 213 (2012)
(“Effective counsel is a prerequisite to the assertion of nearly every other right in the criminal
justice system.”); Natapoff, supra note 96, at 1056 (recognizing defense counsel as “the
preeminent existing safeguard for defendant rights and accurate outcomes”); see also Gross,
supra note 10, at 773–74 (stating that a quarter of the exonerations in the National Registry of
Exonerations are coded as involving “Inadequate Legal Defense,” but regarding many
additional exonerees, it is thought that they “would not have been wrongfully convicted if
their lawyers had done good work defending them”).
177. See, e.g., James Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–
1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000) (finding ineffective defense lawyering to be the
biggest contributing factor to the wrongful conviction of capital defendants over a twentythree-year period).
178. See Adele Bernhard, Effective Assistance of Counsel, in WRONGLY CONVICTED:
PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 220, 227 (Saundra Westervelt & John Humphrey eds., 2001)
(“It is the defense counsel’s responsibility to protect [the innocent] from the mistakes of
others: from witnesses’ misidentifications, police officers’ rush to judgment, and
prosecution’s reluctance to reveal potentially exculpatory material.”).
179. See Janet Moore, Reviving Escobedo, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1015, 1016 (2019).
180. See Myron Beldock et al., Opinion, The Death of the “Hurricane” and the Criminal
Justice System’s Failures, LAW.COM (Apr. 14, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/
nationallawjournal/almID/1202652582104/the-death-of-the-hurricane-and-the-criminal-
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intricacies of the criminal law and all that it offers to the defense; negotiate
with the prosecutor, and argue to the judge, for dismissal;181 and argue to the
jury for acquittal. They can also make effective use of discovery,182 analyze
the evidence, conduct skillful jury selection, prepare their lay and expert
witnesses to testify persuasively, educate the jurors through the use of lay
and expert witnesses, conduct a cross-examination that exposes inaccuracies
in the government’s evidence,183 put together powerful direct examinations
and demonstrative aids, and so on.
But this all takes time, skill,184 money,185 experience, investigation,
training,186 clout, zeal, incentives that allow that zeal to flourish, and the
backing of the law as interpreted by the court. Attorneys for many criminal
defendants, including many who are indigent,187 lack some or all of these.188
Aspects of this crisis include deficits in time,189 skill,190 money,191

justice-systems-failures/ [https://perma.cc/742S-3Z8V] (listing remedies “to significantly cut
down the number of wrongful convictions” and mentioning that “poor defendants need
adequately funded and trained defense counsel who have full investigative and technical
experts to support them”).
181. See Roberts, supra note 133, at 834.
182. See Richard Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 252 (“A good
lawyer cannot guarantee that an innocent person will not be convicted, but an aggressive
advocate might discover exculpatory evidence, or might uncover fatal flaws in the
prosecution’s case, either of which can change the balance to make it less likely that an
innocent person will be convicted.”).
183. Note the common description of cross-examination as “the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
184. See Sklansky, supra note 93, at 14 (“Defendants suffer all the time because of their
attorneys’ incompetence; that is the natural if disconcerting result of allowing a procedural
system to place great weight on lawyerly skill.”).
185. See Donald Dripps, Does Liberal Procedure Cause Punitive Substance?, 87 S. CAL.
L. REV. 459, 466 n.24 (2014) (mentioning Stuntz’s recommendation that courts should
promote accurate verdicts by, for example, encouraging funding for indigent defense).
186. See Beldock et al., supra note 180.
187. 80 to 85 percent of criminal defendants are indigent. See Lisa Pruitt & Beth Colgan,
Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV.
219, 222 n.14 (2010).
188. See Natapoff, supra note 86, at 1454 n.17 (“Recent studies of indigent defense indicate
that poor defendants often receive little or no meaningful representation.”). Note that these
concerns extend to other defense attorneys as well. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
189. See Jain, supra note 109, at 959 (“Overworked defense attorneys—in egregious cases,
representing upwards of two thousand clients per year—provide no meaningful advice.”);
Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043,
1045 (2013) (“[O]verworked public defenders typically advise clients to accept pleas based
on aggregate criteria such as the ‘market price’ for that offense in that jurisdiction, rather than
the individual evidence . . . .”); Stuntz, supra note 91, at 40 (“In a system in which . . . public
defenders represent hundreds of felony defendants per year, defense lawyers’ most important
job is triage: deciding which (few) cases to contest somewhat, which (very few) cases to
contest seriously, and which ones not to contest at all.”).
190. See David Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
ONLINE 25, 29 (2017).
191. See Natapoff, supra note 86, at 1454 n.17 (“[T]he overwhelming evidence indicates
that state public defender offices and appointed counsel are overburdened and
underresourced.”); Stuntz, supra note 91, at 11 (stating that the “pay scales” of defense counsel
“seem to preclude more than nominal litigation in more than a tiny number of cases”).
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experience,192 investigation,193 and training,194 as well as incentives that
point toward placating the prosecutor,195 mollifying the judge,196 not taking
time away from other clients,197 and seeking the quickest resolution
possible,198 which is often a guilty plea.199 Caseloads can reach into the
thousands,200 and the average standard of representation of those who are
poor is low.201 Underfunding and overwork mean that, according to one
national report, public defenders “cannot interview their clients properly,
effectively seek their pretrial release, file appropriate motions, conduct
necessary fact investigations, negotiate responsibly with the prosecutor,
adequately prepare for hearings, and perform countless other tasks that
normally would be undertaken by a lawyer with sufficient time and
resources.”202 Legal and resource constraints also threaten defense
192. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1360 (“The prosecution typically has the more
experienced lawyers . . . .”).
193. See Eve Brensike Primus, Disaggregating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine:
Four Forms of Constitutional Ineffectiveness, 72 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript
at
33),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3477482
[https://perma.cc/QB7Z-SREL] (“Many defendants plead guilty to serious crimes without
their attorneys’ ever having conducted real investigations.”).
194. Id. (“Studies repeatedly reveal that indigent defense delivery systems are woefully
underfunded and accordingly staffed by defense attorneys who often lack adequate training or
supervision and whose caseloads are impossible for any attorney to manage effectively.”).
195. See F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the
Innocent, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 211 (2002).
196. Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants and the Criminalization of Poverty, 12 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 445, 463–64 (2015); Primus, supra note 193 (manuscript at 33) (stating that
often “the defense function is not sufficiently independent of the judges, such that defense
lawyers are poorly equipped to withstand judicial pressure to process cases quickly—pressure
that sometimes includes judges punishing defense attorneys for investigating cases, filing
motions, or asserting their clients’ rights”).
197. See George C. Thomas III, How Gideon v. Wainwright Became Goldilocks, 12 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 322 (2015).
198. See id.
199. Koppl & Sacks, supra note 151, at 150 (noting that all three systems of governmentfunded defense representation lack “an incentive to provide the best defense possible” and
involve “a strong incentive to plea bargain”).
200. ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL
AMERICA’S
BROKEN
MISDEMEANOR
COURTS
9
(2009),
https://
OF
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/9b7f8e10-a118-4c23-8e12-1abcc46404ae/
misdemeanor_20090401.pdf [https://perma.cc/X57L-4GM4] (“In Chicago, Atlanta and
Miami, defenders carry more than 2,000 misdemeanor cases per year.”); Stuntz, supra note
91, at 70 (“[C]ounsel must bear caseloads that require them to start with a strong presumption
against any significant investment in any given case.”).
201. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 275.
202. NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7 (2009), http://
www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM3T-6PGV]; see also Tigran
Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in
Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 335 (2013) (noting that the crisis is not limited to
public defenders but rather that “lawyers who represent indigent defendants under contracts
with the government, or who receive appointments directly from the court, too frequently
engage in subpar performance on behalf of their clients”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 570 n.242 (2001) (“Legislatures . . . fund
appointed defense counsel at levels that require an enormous amount of selectivity—counsel
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attorneys’ ability to gain access to discovery,203 including discovery of
exculpatory material,204 and to expert witnesses,205 as well as their ability to
select an impartial jury,206 confront witnesses in a meaningful way,207 and
attempt certain defenses.208
Legal rules and standards often fail to impose a meaningful check on any
of this. Ethical rules governing defense attorneys set a low bar,209 and
failures to clear the bar often go unremedied.210 Regarding the U.S.
Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court’s declaration of a right to counsel does
not include a funding mandate211: the process that has evolved for poor
defendants as a result is, as Professor William Stuntz put it, “a scandal.”212
And while the standard that the Supreme Court set out in Strickland v.
Washington213 requires that defense counsel be effective, this standard has
been described as meaningless.214 It is worse than meaningless if it serves to
can contest only a very small fraction of the cases on their dockets, and can investigate only a
small fraction of the claims their clients might have . . . . The consequence is to steer criminal
litigation away from the facts, and toward more cheaply raised constitutional claims. Those
claims tend not to correlate with innocence; or if they do, the correlation may be perverse.”).
David Sklansky points out that this kind of problem exists with privately retained attorneys
too. See Sklansky, supra note 93, at 11 (“Attorneys can undermine their clients’ chances by
investigating cursorily, by questioning witnesses ineffectively, and by arguing unpersuasively.
The lawyers appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants damage their clients’ cases
too often in all of these ways. A distressing number of privately retained defense attorneys
fail their clients in similar fashion.”).
203. See Beldock et al., supra note 180 (mentioning that “defense counsel must have access
to both police investigators and witnesses pretrial” while listing remedies “to significantly cut
down the number of wrongful convictions”).
204. See Kozinski, supra note 75, at xxvi (explaining that, of the “three ingredients”
required “before we can be sure that the prosecution has met its Brady obligations under the
law applicable in most jurisdictions,” the first is “a highly committed defense lawyer with
significant resources at his disposal”).
205. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1376.
206. See, e.g., Verified Petition, supra note 127, at 2–4 (“Without access to the effective
assistance of counsel, the poor stand alone against the full unchecked power of the State. They
are denied not only their right to a fair trial, but are powerless to exercise the other fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the right to speedy trial, to confront witnesses,
to impartial juries; the rights against unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination;
and the right to be free from excessive bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.”).
207. See id.
208. See Richard Delgado, Rotten Social Background: Should the Criminal Law Recognize
a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 38 (1985) (“[I]nsanity has
been called the ‘rich man’s defense.’”(quoting WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, HANDBOOK
ON CRIMINAL LAW 272 (1972))).
209. See Raeder et al., supra note 147, at 18.
210. See id. at 19.
211. See William Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 93 (1995) (“[T]he Court
has effectively ensured that Gideon guarantees little more than the presence of a person with
a law license alongside the accused during trial.”).
212. Stuntz, supra note 91, at 76 (“Making Gideon a formal right only, without any
ancillary funding requirements, has produced a criminal process that is, for poor defendants,
a scandal.”).
213. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
214. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 276 (“That our current ineffective assistance doctrine
is incapable of capturing those lawyers whose representation includes a failure to perform
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demean the Sixth Amendment.215 It is worse than meaningless if it feeds off
its own awfulness: to meet Strickland’s first prong, one must identify
lawyering that is worse than average, and, as Professor David Sklansky puts
it, “the average quality of indigent defense lawyering is scandalously
low.”216 To meet its second prong, one must show a reasonable probability
that, without the subpar representation, the result would have been different.
But, the worse the defense attorney, the stronger the prosecutorial evidence
that pours into the record and thus the harder it is to satisfy this prejudice
test.217 Further, in many cases where convictions are imposed, there is no
defense attorney,218 so the question of effectiveness becomes moot. Risky
though it may be to represent oneself,219 when the provision of public defense
comes with a fee attached—as often happens220—there is more of an
incentive to go it alone.
This is but a brief review of some of the inadequacies of defense
representation—inadequacies that can enable the conviction of the

‘basic tasks’ shows how meaningless our current legal standards are.”); Raeder et al., supra
note 147, at 16 (“Inadequate defense counsel played a significant role in the rising tide of
wrongful convictions. We say ‘inadequate’ because counsel can meet the constitutionally
minimal requirement of effectiveness while still failing to provide the level of quality
representation that a system concerned with a reasonable degree of error-avoidance should
expect.”).
215. See Stephen Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1883 (1994) (stating that the Supreme
Court’s “acceptance of the current quality of representation in capital cases as inevitable or
even acceptable demeans the Sixth Amendment”).
216. Primus, supra note 193 (manuscript at 63) (“[D]octrine in this area should be willing
to treat norms as normative, rather than solely as descriptive of the lowest common
denominator of legal representation in a given jurisdiction.”); see also Sklansky, supra note
93, at 20.
217. See Bright, supra note 215, at 1864 (“Nor are reviewing courts able to determine after
the fact the difference made by other skills that are often missing in the defense of criminal
cases—such as conducting a good voir dire examination of jurors, effective examination and
cross-examination of witnesses, and presenting well-reasoned and persuasive closing
arguments.”).
218. See, e.g., Jain, supra note 109, at 959 (“Defendants are not entitled to counsel or jury
trials in all low-level cases.”). Note also that even where the federal Constitution does
guarantee counsel, judges do not always respect those guarantees. See NAT’L ASS’N OF
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, RUSH TO JUDGMENT: HOW SOUTH CAROLINA’S SUMMARY COURTS
FAIL TO PROTECT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 6 (2017), https://www.nacdl.org/Document/
RushtoJudgmentSCSummaryCourtsDontProtectConstRight [https://perma.cc/E6NZ-AP36].
219. Sklansky, supra note 93, at 11 (“Defendants generally make a hash of representing
themselves, often spectacularly so.”).
220. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A
BARRIER TO REENTRY 12 (2010) (“In practice, defender fees often discourage individuals from
exercising their constitutional right to an attorney—leading to wrongful convictions, overincarceration, and significant burdens on the operation of courts.”); J. D. King, Privatizing
Criminal Procedure, 107 GEO. L.J. 561, 571 (2019) (stating that by 2017, “at least forty-three
states had adopted the practice” of “charging criminal defendants for court-appointed
counsel”).
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innocent221—that have been explored within legal scholarship.222 What is
curious is that, as with the predominance of the plea, flaws that are
acknowledged when the focus is upon them often seem to be obscured—to
lie hidden in their silos223—when scholars discuss people with
convictions.224 The next section will examine the kinds of contexts in which,
once a conviction has been imposed, the scholarly assumption often seems
to be that it can reliably be understood as connoting factual guilt. But first,
this Article addresses the question of whether the concerns raised above
cannot be ironed out postconviction, so that one can at least safely assume
that a final conviction connotes factual guilt.
C. Inadequacy of Postconviction Safeguards
Both the predominance of the plea and the subordination of the defense
mean that preconviction screening for innocence may be minimal or absent.
But perhaps one could rely on a presumption that a conviction, once final,
connotes factual guilt, if one felt that our appellate and postconviction
mechanisms generally serve to correct any errors that may have occurred at
the plea or trial stage. Some indeed take that position.225 But legal scholars
have pointed out many reasons why such mechanisms seem unable to serve
that function.
While it is true that a variety of potential stages of review exist—direct
appeals in state courts226 and collateral postconviction proceedings in state
and federal courts227—at each, the chance of a successful claim is generally

221. See Adele Bernhard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Innocence Revolution:
A Standards-Based Approach, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION 226,
226 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017) (“Studies of the DNA exoneration dataset show that poor
defense lawyering is a major factor in the conviction of the innocent.”); Gabriel J. Chin,
Unjustified: The Practical Irrelevance of the Justification/Excuse Distinction, 43 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 79, 94 (2009) (finding that, given factors that include “overburdened” defense
attorneys, “verdicts do not always reflect underlying truth”).
222. Note also that the Innocence Project website currently features six “causes” of
wrongful convictions, one of which is “inadequate defense.” See The Causes, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/#causes [https://perma.cc/7R8J-SCQY] (last
visited Apr. 12, 2020).
223. See Dan Simon, Criminal Law at the Crossroads: Turn to Accuracy, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 421, 444–45 (2014) (“[T]he criminal law debate has much to gain from taking a bird’seye view of how the entire system operates as a whole . . . .”).
224. For the notion that none of this is a secret, see, for example, Sklansky, supra note 93,
at 20, which notes that the resources devoted to representation for those who cannot afford to
hire a lawyer are “scandalously inadequate,” and the problem is “well known and persistent.”
See also id. at 11 (explaining that “the average quality of the legal representation provided to
poor defendants is notoriously low”).
225. See Thomas et al., supra note 92, at 294 (“[S]cholars and jurists have long believed
that situations of erroneous incarceration are relatively rare, especially once the rights to
appeal and collateral review are taken into account.”).
226. Note, however, that “only death-sentenced inmates enjoy an appeal-as-of-right to the
highest state court following conviction at trial.” Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, The Death
Penalty and Mass Incarceration: Convergences and Divergences, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 189,
206 (2014).
227. Simon, supra note 72, at 201.
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slim,228 even for “the innocent.”229 There is an absence of effective
procedures for establishing that a conviction is false.230 At the appellate
stage, arguments tend toward procedure rather than substance,231 and if a
substantive argument is attempted, the appellant faces particularly high
standards.232 At the habeas stage, relief is rare,233 thanks to a combination
of statutes, such as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996234 (AEDPA), and aspects of the caselaw, such as the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to declare a right to a freestanding claim of innocence.235 Other
obstacles include delays that deter litigation,236 governmental resistance to
postconviction claims of innocence,237 daunting burdens of proof,238 lack of
representation,239 and difficulty in obtaining the knowledge or evidence
228. Nancy J. King & Michael Heise, Misdemeanor Appeals, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1933, 1941,
1980 (2019) (mentioning “a ratio of about eight appeals for every ten thousand misdemeanor
convictions in state trial courts, or one in 1250” and pointing out that “only one conviction or
sentence out of every ten thousand misdemeanor judgments [was] actually disturbed on
appeal”); Justin Murray, Prejudice-Based Rights in Criminal Procedure, 168 U. PA. L. REV.
277, 311 (2020) (“[J]ust a fraction of convicted defendants challenge their convictions or
sentences on appeal, and an even smaller proportion pursue postconviction review.” (footnote
omitted)).
229. See Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Postconviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 472 (2009) (noting that “the
legal process holds out little hope for wrongfully convicted defendants, especially in the
absence of help from prosecutors”); Thomas et al., supra note 92, at 289 (describing low rates
of success at each stage).
230. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1321–22 (stating that “[t]he absence of effective
procedures for establishing that a conviction is false means that few prisoners can verify their
innocence” and that “[t]he paucity of such cases in turn reinforces the belief that innocent
people are not convicted and justifies the criminal justice system’s failure to provide effective
remedies”).
231. See Rosen, supra note 182, at 284 (stating that, on direct appeal, defendants “cannot
present new evidence of innocence or argue that the jury got it wrong”); Stuntz, supra note
91, at 42–43.
232. See Stuntz, supra note 91, at 61 (“[J]udicial review targeted at potential errors on the
merits—at cases where the wrong person was convicted—has been surprisingly muted.”).
233. See Thomas et al., supra note 92, at 289.
234. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); see Kozinski, supra note 75, at xlii (stating that AEDPA “effectively removes federal
judges as safeguards against miscarriages of justice”); Allegra McLeod, Prison Abolition and
Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1214–15 (2015) (“[U]nder AEDPA, even in cases
with gutting evidence of possible innocence, courts have deferred to the state’s right to kill
possibly innocent persons on the ground that finality of a conviction must take priority over
other moral and constitutional considerations.”).
235. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (stating that “the threshold showing
for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high”).
236. Murray, supra note 228, at 311 n.221.
237. See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, The Path to Exoneration, 79 ALB. L. REV. 325,
332 (2016).
238. See Murray, supra note 228, at 311–12 (“[E]ven when defendants who have wellfounded claims of prejudicial error do seek appellate or postconviction relief, there is a risk
that courts reviewing those claims will reject them anyway due to deficient pleading or
briefing (especially at the postconviction stage, where most defendants have to proceed pro
se), incentives to preserve finality, the stringent burden of proof that defendants must satisfy
under Bagley, Strickland, and related cases, and other reasons.” (footnotes omitted)).
239. Daniel Givelber notes that, in order to obtain collateral relief on the basis of a
prosecutorial failure to turn over exculpatory evidence, “the defendant must discover the
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necessary to make a viable claim.240 In addition, it is dangerous to claim
innocence if one may need to show remorse.241
Additional difficulties cluster around the two vulnerabilities on which this
Article focuses: pleas and counsel. Pleading guilty leads to significant
restrictions on the possibility of a subsequent claim of innocence.242 The
guilty plea may involve waivers of most of the salient appellate issues243 and
of the ability to appeal.244 And in regard to those who may have had
inadequate defense representation, the courts hold defense attorneys to
meager standards245 and litigation delays deter their invocation.246 In
addition, rules relating to unpreserved errors247 and procedural default248
further penalize those with subpar counsel.249
existence of exculpatory evidence.” Givelber, supra note 9, at 1389–90. “As a practical
matter, this requires [among other things] a lawyer prepared to engage in post-conviction
litigation.” Id. at 1390; Simon, supra note 72, at 201 (“[T]he majority of inmates conduct their
post-conviction affairs without the benefit of legal counsel.”); Steiker & Steiker, supra note
226, at 206 (“Although all state prisoners are nominally afforded the right to litigate
constitutional claims in federal habeas corpus, only death-sentenced inmates are statutorily
afforded counsel in cases of indigency. The same is true in most states regarding
representation in state post-conviction proceedings.”).
240. See Kozinski, supra note 75, at xv; Murray, supra note 228, at 311 n.221 (mentioning
that “some defendants simply lack knowledge about the errors that might support a claim for
relief—particularly when the type of error in question is the suppression of Brady evidence,
which is by its nature hidden from view unless and until the concealed evidence is fortuitously
discovered”).
241. Rosen, supra note 182, at 282–83.
242. See Miller, supra note 171, at 4 (“[A] number of states have interpreted their
postconviction statutes to prohibit pleading defendants from (1) seeking DNA testing and/or
(2) presenting freestanding claims of actual innocence based upon non-DNA evidence.”).
243. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 281 (“Prosecutors can condition a plea bargain on a
defendant’s waiver of her right to DNA testing, and they can also require defendants to waive
any rights to appeal or to otherwise challenge their convictions. There are plenty of examples
of innocent defendants who have pleaded guilty rather than wait for DNA testing because
prosecutors refused to keep the plea bargain offer open until the tests came back and
defendants knew the results might be inconclusive.”); Hughes, supra note 11, at 1111 (stating
that “defendants who plead guilty forego most of their salient appellate issues in the process
of pleading guilty”); Sklansky, supra note 93, at 12 (stating that “waivers of the right to appeal
and the right to seek habeas review are common features of plea agreements”).
244. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 281.
245. See id. at 275 (“The courts have continued to apply exactingly high standards of
review to ineffective assistance claims. So even though judges now know for certain that an
ineffective defense attorney can significantly increase the chances of an innocent person being
convicted, those judges are still unlikely to grant a new trial to a defendant with a hopelessly
bad lawyer.”).
246. See Primus, supra note 193 (manuscript at 24 n.117) (“Most defendants have no
incentive (or even ability) to file post-conviction challenges to their trial attorneys’
performance, because it takes years to get to post-conviction review and the defendants are
released from custody before post-conviction review becomes possible.”).
247. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 103(e).
248. See Sklansky, supra note 93, at 12 (explaining that attorney negligence can lead to the
forfeiture of some of the rights to seek review of a conviction).
249. See Bright, supra note 215, at 1862 (“So long as counsel’s performance passes muster
under Strickland, those cases in which the accused received the poorest legal representation
will receive the least scrutiny on appeal and in postconviction review because of [the] failure
of the lawyer to preserve issues.”); see also id. (“Failure of counsel to recognize and preserve

2530

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

In reviewing the universe of factors, both pre- and postconviction, that
jeopardize reliability, it might almost appear that the system is not that
interested in accuracy.250 Indeed, some scholars have arrived at that
conclusion.251
From the broad applicability and severe nature of the weaknesses within
plea bargaining, defense representation, and the postconviction opportunities
to assess accuracy, this Article draws the conclusion that there is no reason
for blanket assumptions that conviction connotes crime commission and
every reason to assume that some unknown but potentially large proportion
of convictions are imposed in the absence of factual guilt. As will be
discussed below, many scholars attempt to quantify, or at least estimate, the
proportion of convictions that are imposed in the absence of factual guilt.252
This Article urges attention to the limitations of such attempts, particularly
in light of the concept of “innocence” presented in this Article, namely the
situation where one did not commit the crime in question, with crime
understood in its full definition, including elements such as mens rea and the
absence of defenses. This Article posits instead that one should admit
ignorance as to the number of convictions imposed in the absence of factual
guilt and not rush from ignorance to an assumption that the number must be
very small.253 Yet even though factors contributing to the unreliability of
convictions are widely discussed within legal scholarship,254 in a variety of
contexts legal scholars talk about those with convictions in ways that appear
to assume reliability. The next Part will discuss this apparent barrier between
understandings of the criminal system and views of those who pass through
it.

an issue, due to ignorance, neglect, or failure to discover and rely upon proper grounds or
facts, even in the heat of trial, will bar federal review of that issue.”).
250. See Rebecca Shaeffer, Remarks at the ABA Eleventh Annual Criminal Justice Section
Fall Institute (Nov. 2, 2018) (event attended by author) (discussing how, due to the societal
interest in truth-finding and building a record, most countries, but not the United States, limit
the kinds of cases eligible for plea bargaining).
251. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1336 (“[V]irtually everything known about the actual
operation of the criminal justice system points to a level of indifference regarding the accuracy
of fact determination which routinely condemns the innocent and frees the guilty.”); Simon,
supra note 24, at 204 (“One of the most complicated and underappreciated features of the
criminal justice process is the low value it assigns to the accuracy of its factual
determinations—or, in legal parlance, the finding of truth.”); id. at 205–06 (giving numerous
examples of how “[t]he relegation of factual accuracy manifests itself throughout the criminal
justice process”); id. at 210 (“It is noteworthy that despite the pervasive relegation of the
correct determination of facts, proponents of the criminal justice process swear by the
accuracy of its outcomes.”).
252. See Cassell, supra note 25, at 817 (“[W]hile staking out a position of unknowability,
many of the same scholars have been willing to venture specific estimates of a false conviction
rate . . . .”).
253. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1330 (stating that for a “large and crucial subset of the
[criminal court] docket,” the conclusion that convictions are valid “is more leap of faith than
demonstrable fact”).
254. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 193 (manuscript at 1) (“Everyone knows that the
conditions under which indigent defense services are provided often make effective
representation impossible.”).
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II. FUSION OF LEGAL AND FACTUAL GUILT
Despite the vulnerabilities laid out in Part I—vulnerabilities that this
Article argues should leave a question mark hanging over the reliability of
criminal convictions as markers of factual guilt—legal scholarship often
appears to take that factual guilt as a given. This Part will give examples,
first of explicit statements voicing confidence in the correspondence between
legal and factual guilt and, second, of situations where the factual guilt of
those with convictions appears to be assumed. Since it is sometimes said that
the factual guilt of those with convictions must be taken as a given by some
of those who work within the criminal system,255 this Part will end by
considering the distinct role of legal scholars.
A. Explicit Statements
As this section will show, scholars often assert that those with convictions
are for the most part factually guilty;256 indeed, scholars often assert that
most defendants are guilty257 and that the core work of the defense bar is to
represent the guilty.258 In addition, legal scholars sometimes try to pin down
or cabin the proportion of convictions that are “wrongful” through invocation
of statistics in a way that risks downplaying the extent of the problem.
First, despite the fact that the standard of proof required for guilty pleas
best approximates probable cause,259 it is not unusual for legal scholars to
assert that convictions are necessarily the product of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.260 Some then move from a confidence in the procedures
that have preceded convictions to an assertion that the reliability of the
convictions is high. Thus, Professor Victor Gold states that because
convictions are the result of either guilty pleas or trials, the misconduct said

255. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 10, at 779 (“For the most part, inmates in American prisons
are guilty. The African Americans among them may have been victims of discrimination by
the police or in court, but the overwhelming majority are imprisoned for crimes they did
commit.”).
257. See Stuntz, supra note 91, at 34 (“The large majority of defendants presumably are
guilty . . . .”).
258. See, e.g., Givelber, supra note 9, at 1396 (“It is, after all, a commonplace that the role
of defense counsel is to defend the guilty, not the innocent.”).
259. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 43–44.
260. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE: TEACHER’S MANUAL 183 (3d ed. 2013) (stating that
“[b]y definition, crimes introduced under Rule 609 [the federal evidence rule permitting
impeachment by prior conviction, whether the conviction was the product of trial or a guilty
plea] have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt”); Chin, supra note 221, at 90 (stating that
“a valid conviction represents a finding that every element of a particular offense has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt”); Findley, supra note 11, at 1196 (“[P]resumably every
one of the prosecutors in the 270 plus DNA exonerations at one time believed, and convinced
a fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty . . . .”); Victor Gold,
Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of Rule 609, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2310 (1994) (“Any doubts that the witness [being impeached with her
conviction] committed the crime in question are negligible since a conviction rests on
satisfaction of the most demanding burden of proof [i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt].”).
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to have been committed by the defendant “is almost certain to have
occurred.”261
Many legal scholars are comfortable asserting that those who await
adjudication of their charges—that is, those who are still defendants—are
mostly guilty, thus indicating by implication that a still higher proportion of
those who are convicted are guilty.262 It is also common to state that the role
of the defense attorney is to represent the guilty.263 Of course, given the
elusive nature of factual guilt,264 it is hard for scholars who assert the
predominance of factual guilt to support those claims. They either offer no
support, point out that Alan Dershowitz said it,265 or provide figures
representing legal guilt (that is, convictions),266 as opposed to factual guilt.
261. 28 VICTOR J. GOLD ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6118 (2d ed. 2019)
(“Evidence admitted under Rule 609 relates to witness misconduct that is almost certain to
have occurred since it was the subject of a criminal conviction.”); see also Victor Gold, Two
Jurisdictions, Three Standards: The Admissibility of Misconduct Evidence to Impeach, 36
SW. U. L. REV. 769, 775 (2008) (claiming that there is “no serious question” about the
witness’s guilt, “since a conviction must be based on either the witness’ guilty plea or on proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”); Edward Imwinkelried & Miguel Méndez, Resurrecting
California’s Old Law on Character Evidence, 23 PAC. L.J. 1005, 1034 (1992) (“[I]n the case
of convictions the evidence is reliable. The accused either admitted committing the crime by
a plea of guilty or has been found guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
262. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 216 (4th ed. 2011) (“[M]ost defendants are guilty of some crime.”); H.
RICHARD UVILLER, THE TILTED PLAYING FIELD: IS CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNFAIR? 119 (1999)
(“[N]early all defendants are in fact guilty . . . .”); Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the
Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 182 (1983) (“[M]ost defendants are guilty of something
along the lines of the accusation.”); Bowers, supra note 148, at 1162 (“[M]ost defendants are
in fact guilty . . . .”); Joshua Dressler, The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day Criminal
Sentencing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 853, 865 (2005) (“[M]ost criminal defendants are guilty . . . .”);
Robinson O. Everett, Foreword, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 1, 8 (“[M]any
assume—probably correctly—that most criminal defendants are guilty of some crime.”);
Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 288 (2011)
(offering as the first of two “basic truths about the criminal justice system” the fact that “most
criminal defendants are guilty”); Jeffries, supra note 103, at 225 (“Most criminal defendants
are guilty of something . . . .”); Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining,
26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 99 (2015) (“[E]xperienced judges know that most defendants
are guilty . . . .”); Michael O’Hear, What’s Good About Trials?, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 209, 209–10 (2007) (referring to “the reality that most defendants are guilty”);
Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921, 971 (1985)
(“Most defendants are guilty and lack a credible defense . . . .”); Kenworthey Bilz, The Fall
of the Confession Era, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 367, 376 (2005) (reviewing LAWRENCE
M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(2005)) (“[M]ost criminal defendants are guilty.”).
263. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
265. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 145, at xxi (stating that the first of the “Rules of the Justice
Game” is “[a]lmost all criminal defendants are, in fact, guilty” and that “[a]ll criminal defense
lawyers, prosecutors and judges understand and believe” that to be true).
266. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Miranda Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 162 &
n.36 (2013). Schauer asserts that
most criminal defendants are guilty of the crimes with which they have been
charged, and that many of those who are not guilty of the crimes with which they
are charged are guilty of other crimes, crimes often identical to or resembling or
associated with the crimes with which they have been charged.
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Finally, legal scholars sometimes cite statistics in an effort to quantify the
problem of convictions being imposed in the absence of factual guilt. Such
attempts to cabin the phenomenon risk downplaying its extent, at least when
the underlying research is cited without much context.267 The kinds of
figures that get circulated as the proportion of people with convictions who
are “wrongfully convicted” or “innocent” undercount in a variety of ways.
When calculated on the basis of actual cases that came to light, for instance,
they are likely to exclude those who lacked the representation,268
incentive,269 written record,270 knowledge,271 or the correct procedural
vehicle272 to get recognition that their conviction was wrongful.273 They are
also generally restricted to certain kinds of “wrongful conviction”274 or
“innocence,”275 such as “wrong-man” scenarios.276 Further, they are often
limited to those—the vast minority of those who may be innocent—who are
able to obtain an exoneration277 or the even smaller group able to obtain a
DNA-based exoneration.278 Lastly, they may exclude, or largely exclude,
Id. He further claims:
[t]his conclusion is an extrapolation from existing figures on guilty pleas (some of
which will admittedly be by innocent defendants) and on conviction rates at trial
(some of which will be erroneous) . . . but even the most conservative extrapolation
is sufficient to support the point in the text.
Id. However, no support is given for that final redemptive assertion.
267. See Gould & Leo, supra note 20, at 832 (“Virtually no one denies the existence of
wrongful convictions, while the several studies on this question cap estimates at around 3% to
5% of convictions.”).
268. See Roberts, supra note 133, at 780.
269. See Findley, supra note 11, at 1170 n.58.
270. See Gross & O’Brien, supra note 172, at 939.
271. See Roberts, supra note 133, at 812.
272. See id. at 813.
273. See Gould & Leo, supra note 20, at 834 (stating that “‘lesser’ felonies, and certainly
misdemeanors, may lack the record and interested advocates to investigate and pursue
exonerations”).
274. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1327 (pointing out that commentators take a
conservative approach to defining this term).
275. Id.
276. See D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762 n.2 (2007) (carving out
of his influential estimates those who have “undoubtedly performed the actus reus of a crime
for which they are not culpable, either because of insanity or the absence of some other
required indicium of culpability, usually a particular required mental state”).
277. See Gross, supra note 10, at 785 (“[T]he number of false convictions is far higher than
the number of exonerations.”); id. (noting that almost no misdemeanor exonerations occur);
see also ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 111 (2008) (“Innocence
projects almost never take misdemeanor cases.”). See Gross et al., supra note 154, at 7234,
for a definition of “exoneration” as “an official determination that a convicted defendant is no
longer legally culpable for the crime for which he was condemned.”
278. Note that the 5 percent “ceiling” often drawn from Risinger was limited to DNAexoneration cases, and that Risinger cautions against extrapolating from DNA cases since they
are not a random sample of all cases of criminal conviction. Risinger, supra note 276, at 770.
DNA exonerations “are almost entirely rapes and murders.” Findley, supra note 11, at 1167;
see also Gould & Leo, supra note 20, at 835 (stating that many exonerations have been based
on DNA testing, yet “fewer than 20% of violent crimes involve biological evidence, and in
the vast majority of past cases, biological evidence was not properly collected and held for
future testing”); Robert Schehr et al., Contemporary Perspectives on Wrongful Conviction:
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those who, even if able to obtain exoneration, obtained an exoneration whose
existence was unknown to the researchers,279 and those who took pleas rather
than going to trial.280
These limitations often go unmentioned when the underlying studies are
discussed. In addition, figures drawn from studies that may have been
limited to particular time periods,281 particular types of convictions,282 or
small sample sizes,283 or that may be “wildly unrepresentative”284 or
explicitly described by their authors as unsuitable for generalization,285 often
get discussed without these sorts of qualifications,286 as if they can provide
Further, even when
nationwide “wrongful conviction” figures.287
An Introduction to the 2015 Innocence Network Conference, Orlando, Florida, 3 TEX. A&M
L. REV. 179, 180 (2015) (“DNA exonerations are just a small percentage of wrongful
convictions.”).
279. See Gross, supra note 10, at 784–85 (“No American jurisdiction has any system for
recording exonerations; we have to go out and find the stories by whatever means we can
devise.”); see also id. at 761 (“For many exonerations, avoiding attention may be a goal of all
the professional participants in the case.”).
280. See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 276, at 773 (presenting an analysis based on a study
solely of trials); see also Findley, supra note 11, at 1167 (stating that it is quite likely that a
huge proportion of false convictions are the product of pleas in cases other than rapes and
murders).
281. See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 276, at 762 (presenting an analysis based on a study of
trials that occurred from 1982 through 1989).
282. Gould & Leo, supra note 20, at 836. “[M]ost of what we know concerns errors in the
most serious criminal cases—rapes and murders, and capital trials at that,” but it could be that
“errors are more common, and more commonly accepted, in cases where neither police nor
prosecutors have as much time, resources, or pressure to investigate cases thoroughly and in
which the lesser stakes of punishment do not command as many or as zealous advocates to
investigate cases postconviction.” Id.; see also Findley, supra note 11, at 1168 (“Offenders
convicted of rape make up less than ten percent of state prisoners and offenders convicted of
murder or non-negligent homicide compose only thirteen percent of state prisoners.”); Gould
& Leo, supra note 20, at 862 (explaining that in the most serious cases “courts are most likely
to step in and reverse a faulty conviction”); Samuel Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Letters to the
Journal, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 273, 275 (2010) (“Ninety-five percent of known false
convictions—exonerations—occur in cases of murder or rape, the two most serious common
crimes of violence, which, between them, account for only about two percent of felony
convictions. That means that we know very little about false convictions for any other crimes
of violence and virtually nothing about false convictions for non-violent felonies and
misdemeanors. (And even among rape cases, the false convictions we know about are
concentrated among the minority of defendants who receive very long prison sentences.)”).
283. In regard to Risinger’s influential study, Professor Paul Cassell states, for example,
that “[i]t is important to note that Risinger’s conclusions ultimately rest on a very small
number of wrongful convictions—a total of only 11.” Cassell, supra note 25, at 828.
284. See Gross, supra note 10, at 785.
285. See Risinger, supra note 276, at 784–85 (stating that even though an average number
might “salve our consciences,” one “cannot jump from a 3–5% factual wrongful conviction
rate in capital rape-murders in the 1980s to a general factual wrongful conviction rate for
crimes,” in part because there “probably would be [] contexts and kinds of crime in which the
rate of factual innocence was higher, perhaps shockingly so”).
286. See, e.g., Tiffany R. Murphy, “But I Still Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For”:
The Supreme Court’s Struggle Understanding Factual Investigations in Federal Habeas
Corpus, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1129, 1131 n.51 (2016) (“[R]esearchers suggest the rate of
wrongful convictions in this country is 2–5 percent of the current prison population.”).
287. See Risinger, supra note 276, at 783 (arguing that one should “resist the temptation to
expend much effort in pondering . . . a general average factual wrongful conviction rate”).
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researchers come up with figures that they describe as floors, they sometimes
appear in secondary literature as estimates of the figure288 or even of a
ceiling.289 These figures, in other words, are sometimes presented as if this
simply is innocence290 and simply is the scale of the innocence problem.
Professor Samuel Gross cautions that “[p]atchy and unrepresentative data
can mislead”291 and that “[o]n this topic they’ve led smart people to say that
convictions of innocent defendants are vanishingly rare—which is
demonstrably false.”292 And yet the estimates continue, most recently from
Professor Paul Cassell,293 who presents the contestable nature of previous
estimates not as a reason to hold back but as a justification for trying once
again.294
B. Embedded Implications
Ground into our core definitional text is an assumption that legal guilt
connotes factual guilt. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “offender” as
“[s]omeone who has committed a crime; esp., one who has been convicted
of a crime.”295 Its portrayal of those convicted is of a Russian doll tucked
inside another larger one, which comprises those who committed the crime.
The use by legal scholars of “offender” to connote both those who have been
convicted of a crime and those who (can be assumed to have) committed it
is thus consistent with the dictionary definition296 but, this Article suggests,
288. Compare Gould & Leo, supra note 237, at 362 (stating that Risinger’s study puts the
estimate for wrongful convictions in capital cases at 3.3 percent), with Risinger, supra note
276, at 780 (presenting this figure as an “empirical minimum” with a “fairly generous likely
maximum of 5%”).
289. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 239–40 (2015)
(citing the study by Professor Samuel Gross in support of a 1 to 4 percent range). Gross offered
the 4.1 percent figure as a minimum. See Gross et al., supra note 154, at 7234.
290. See Schehr et al., supra note 278, at 180 (“[T]he few studies that have been conducted
estimate that between 2.3% and 5% of all prisoners in the U.S. are innocent.”).
291. Gross, supra note 10, at 785.
292. Id. (adding that patchy and unrepresentative data has also led smart people “to believe
that innocent people almost never plead guilty—but we have seen that they do, in large
numbers”).
293. See Cassell, supra note 25, at 851 (focusing on “wrong person” cases and “violent
crimes” and yet proffering an “estimated concrete, empirically grounded wrongful conviction
rate range”).
294. See id. at 847 (“[L]ack of firm data has not prevented many other scholars from
venturing an estimated wrongful conviction rate range. The range presented here rests on at
least as firm a foundation as many others that have been presented.”).
295. Offender, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
296. See, e.g., Francis Cullen et al., Reinventing Community Corrections, 46 CRIME & JUST.
27, 33 (2017) (“People are in the correctional system because they are offenders. For most,
the current arrest and conviction represents only a fraction of the crimes they have
committed.”); Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in
Minnesota’s Prison and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 263 (2009) (“[O]ffenders
released from prison or jail confront family and neighborhood dysfunction, increased risks of
unemployment, and other crime-producing disadvantages; this makes them likelier to commit
new crimes, and the cycle repeats itself.”); Tekle-Johnson, supra note 33, at 613 (“Thrust out
of mainstream urban society into a downward trajectory of ‘homelessness and transience,’ the
convicted sex offender suffers from increased acute ‘psychosocial stressors,’ which is
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is in tension with the factors laid out in Part I. As will be described later,297
what to do about “offenders”—and particularly various subsets of
“offenders,” such as “drug offenders,” “sex offenders,” and “violent
offenders”—is the subject of robust discussion in legal scholarship.298 Less
prominent—perhaps absent thus far—is a discussion of what to do about the
term and whether to reject the implicit fusion of legal and factual guilt that
its definition endorses.
“Recidivism,” used here to mean a return to criminal conduct,299 is another
common topic of debate in legal scholarship that also seems to reveal a
tendency to fuse legal and factual guilt. Convictions are frequently used as
a metric of both the first “criminal conduct” and the “return to criminal
conduct.”300 One finds little or no questioning of the notion that criminal
conviction is appropriate as an indicator of the first criminal conduct: rather,
the widespread emphasis on the importance of measuring the recidivism of
those with convictions appears to take that as a given.301 As for the use of
convictions to indicate a “return to criminal conduct,” when one sees
concerns about that metric, they often involve its underinclusiveness.302 One
rarely finds concerns about the ways in which, because of factors such as
those mentioned in Part I, convictions can be an overinclusive marker of
crime commission.303 Of course, in many instances, a conviction followed
by a conviction may indeed represent criminal conduct followed by a return
thereto. But to hold the view that some, or many, or most situations of this
kind involve recidivism is something different from resting on an assumption
that that is always the case—or frequently enough that one does not need to
mention a caveat.
And then there are a wide variety of propositions made in support of
criminal justice reform that, valuable though they may be, risk reinforcing

alarmingly correlated with an increased tendency to reoffend.” (footnote omitted) (quoting
JILL S. LEVENSON, SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS: A REPORT TO THE FLORIDA
LEGISLATURE 15 (2005))); Marc Morjé Howard, Opinion, The Practical Case for Parole for
Violent Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/opinion/
violent-offender-parole-sentencing-reform.html [https://perma.cc/HC2U-7WV6] (“This
punitiveness makes us stand out as uniquely inhumane in comparison with other industrialized
countries. To remedy this, along with other changes, we must consider opening the exit
doors—and not just for the ‘easy’ cases of nonviolent drug offenders. Yes, I’m suggesting
that we release some of the people who once committed serious, violent crimes. . . . [E]ven
for people convicted of violent crimes if they’ve demonstrated progress during their
imprisonment. . . . It bears no connection to solid research on how criminals usually ‘age out’
of crime . . . . But are prisoners who have served long sentences for violent crimes genuinely
capable of reforming and not reoffending?”).
297. See infra notes 308–10 and accompanying text.
298. See Levin, supra note 30, at 271–72.
299. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1000–07.
300. See id.
301. See, e.g., Klingele, supra note 39, at 769 (“The system’s success is frequently judged
by the recidivism rates of those who are subject to various criminal justice interventions, from
treatment programs to imprisonment.”).
302. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1003.
303. See id.
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assumptions regarding the reliability of criminal convictions as markers of
factual guilt.304 Some examples follow.
Legal scholars have made or endorsed the following kinds of proposals:
that all those with convictions should be given a second chance;305 that once
they have paid their debt to society they should be afforded rehabilitation and
redemption;306 that we should acknowledge that character is not static;307 and
that people change.308 Similarly, scholars state that “sex offenders” should
be spared permanent exile309 since their recidivism rates are not as
“frightening and high” as sometimes feared,310 that “violent offenders”—and
not just “nonviolent drug offenders”—should receive more “leniency,”311
that “juvenile offenders” too should be eligible for lower sentences because
the juvenile brain is different,312 and that “offenders” over a certain age
should be eligible for release because people “age out” of crime.313 Scholars
further argue that we overemphasize individual disposition as a cause of
crime314 when in fact poverty is criminogenic.315 They also urge us to
acknowledge that the misdemeanor system, rather than being a system of
adjudication, acts as an assembly line.316 Finally, they point out that central
to “what ails the petty offense process”317—and indeed the entire criminal
process—is a problem of “overcriminalization.”318
Each of these statements responds to an aspect of the criminal system, or
a view of those who go through it, that is indeed problematic. And yet, even
304. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 570 (“Much of the theory and discourse of criminal
law, including the discourse of ‘reform,’ reproduces or simply takes for granted the ideological
structures that make existing law seem moral and necessary.”).
305. See, e.g., Danielle R. Jones, When the Fallout of a Criminal Conviction Goes Too Far:
Challenging Collateral Consequences, 11 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 237, 240 (2015) (“Nearly ten
years into this work, I still passionately believe that people deserve a second chance—a chance
to redeem themselves, to heal wounds, and to secure work and put roots down in their
community.”); see also id. at 237 (referring to those who have “paid their debt to society”).
306. See id.; supra note 27 and accompanying text.
307. See Jon Schuppe, “I Refused to Be Bitter or Angry”: Matthew Charles, Released from
Prison and Sent Back Again, Begins Life as a Free Man, NBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2019, 4:06 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/i-refuse-be-bitter-or-angry-matthew-charlesreleased-prison-n955796 [https://perma.cc/QCV9-VMTE] (quoting Professor Shon Hopwood
as saying that “I think what Matthew shows is that people can change, character’s not static
and people can have redemption if given the opportunity to come out of federal prison and
show they are a changed person”).
308. See id.
309. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
311. See Andrea Roth, Opinion, To End Mass Incarceration, Look Beyond “Non-violent
Drug Offenders,” L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/laoe-roth-non-violent-prison-clemency-20150724-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y8EU-8VLV].
312. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: What It Is, What It May Be, and What
It Is Not, 78 MO. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2013).
313. Howard, supra note 296.
314. See Binder & Notterman, supra note 32, at 42.
315. See Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1066.
316. See Natapoff, supra note 196, at 447.
317. Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1359 (discussing the incompleteness of the
“overcriminalization viewpoint”).
318. Id. at 1359–60.
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as they advance important goals, each of them risks appearing to take it as a
given that those who are “offenders” in the sense of being legally guilty are
also “offenders” in the sense of being factually guilty.319 After all, having a
second chance at life seems to assume that one had a first chance and blew it
by committing a crime. “Aging out” of crime, or “recidivating” less than
feared, seems to assume that one committed a crime to start with. A plea for
“lenient” sentencing suggests that conviction is appropriate, albeit with a
more generous sentence than usual. And an argument for redemption or
rehabilitation seems to assume that one committed a crime and that, in doing
so, one sinned or revealed that one is sick320 and thus needs fixing.321 If you
say that central to our system of mass incarceration is a problem of
overcriminalization, or that poverty is criminogenic, you risk suggesting that
the way you get to prison (or to a conviction) is by committing a crime.322
This notion of a direct connection between crime and punishment obscures
many layers of influence on the way to punishment, in both the misdemeanor
and felony systems. These layers include not only the role of law
enforcement in policing and prosecuting but the layers of injustice and
vulnerability mentioned earlier—the role of inadequate defense
representation323 and of crushing power to plead guilty.324 Poverty may be
criminogenic (in the sense of making one a “criminal”) not, or not merely,
because it leads to crime commission but because it leads to inadequate or
absent lawyers, to government employees (whether police, judges, or
prosecutors) unrestrained by fear of accountability,325 and to plea bargaining,
at which one is disadvantaged in every sense. This disadvantage can stem

319. At least in the felony context. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 569 (noting that “some
critics of misdemeanor jurisprudence hold out felony jurisprudence as a salutary alternative
representing criminal law at its best”).
320. See Delgado, supra note 208, at 73 (“Rehabilitation assumes that offenders are ‘sick,’
psychologically or morally, and may be required to undergo personality modification to regain
their health.”).
321. See id.
322. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1359–60 (“[T]he overcriminalization viewpoint lacks
two features that might otherwise permit it to better account for the misdemeanor debacle.
First, overcriminalization does not contemplate actual innocence. Indeed, one of its central
complaints is that overbroad codes make everyone guilty. As Stuntz famously put it,
overcriminalization means that eventually ‘the law on the books makes everyone a felon.’ It
may even be that the persuasiveness of the overcriminalization story has caused scholars to
overlook the fact that many convicted misdemeanants are not guilty at all. In this way,
overcriminalization is actually at odds with the innocence revolution.” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Stuntz, supra note 202, at 511)).
323. See supra Part I.B.
324. See supra Part I.A.
325. See Bell, supra note 83, at 2125 (“[A]fter getting a plum assignment to an uppermiddle-class, predominantly white neighborhood, [a former police officer] would sometimes
leave his post to go to a poor, predominantly black neighborhood to make arrests. He needed
to meet his expected number of arrests, but even though there were people using drugs and
committing other crimes in the neighborhood where he was assigned, he knew there would be
‘trouble’ if he arrested the wrong person.”); David A. Sklansky, The Nature and Function of
Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 512 (2016) (“Prosecutors seem
accountable neither to the electorate nor to the legal system.”).
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from the clout one has with one’s lawyer and with the prosecutor,326 from
the limits on defense counsel’s resources, influence, experience, and skill,327
from the assumptions of guilt and feelings of contempt entertained by
decision makers such as judge, juror, and lawyer,328 from an inability to make
bail,329 and so on.
Why does the fusion of legal and factual guilt matter, particularly where
scholars may be advancing important reform goals and correcting important
misunderstandings? Part IV addresses that question.
C. Considerations of Role
In many instances, those working within the criminal system may be
required to hold back from questioning the reliability of convictions.330
Thus, it is said that judges, along with others representing “the system,” need
to project confidence in verdicts.331
On the other hand, activists and advocates for system reform need to
simplify, hone, and make clear their messaging with a view to maximizing
success on the front at which they fight. This may entail downplaying certain
other goals or concerns. So, for example, perhaps you push for “second
chances” because you realize that this message is more likely to resonate than
an argument that our criminal system fails to provide much by way of a first
chance.
This Article urges reflection on the distinct role of legal scholars. We are
(generally) not bound by the rules constraining judges or system
administrators. We are not—though some fear the risk332—propagandists
for the criminal system. Of course, the legal academy is full of accomplished
advocates.333 But it is also a unique space for grappling with the uncertain,
the unknowable, and the conflictual, and for acknowledging areas in which
data does not exist. In that spirit, this Article of course concedes that the
phenomenon of convictions being imposed in the absence of factual guilt is
not one that can be quantified334 but also asserts that it is unwarranted and
problematic to infer from this that the concern is nugatory. After Part III
explores potential explanations for the fusion described in Part II, Part IV
addresses its implications.
326. See Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15, 19–20 (2016); Janet
Moore et al., Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and the Struggle for Criminal
Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1296 (2015).
327. See Sklansky, supra note 190, at 29 (“[E]ven a strong prosecution case can fall apart
in court, particularly when attacked by a good defense attorney.”).
328. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1330 n.44.
329. See Pinto, supra note 120.
330. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
332. See Alice Ristroph, Remarks at the Law and Society Association Annual Conference:
Law at the Crossroads (June 10, 2018) (event attended by author) (raising the question of
whether criminal law professors act as system propagandists).
333. It also, of course, includes professors who teach clinical law, and who thus may serve
as advocates within the academy.
334. See Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 74 (2003).
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III. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
If it is the case that legal scholars often take as a given the factual guilt of
those with convictions—despite being on notice of the system’s
vulnerabilities—one might wonder why. This Part discusses four possible
contributing factors: motivated reasoning, assumptions of guilt that build,
mergers of act and crime, and a narrow conception of innocence.
A. Motivated Reasoning
Motivated reasoning, meaning “the tendency of people to unconsciously
process information—including empirical data, oral and written arguments,
and even their own brute sensory perceptions—to promote goals or interests
extrinsic to the decisionmaking task at hand,”335 might fuel the apparent
fusion of legal and factual guilt, for a variety of reasons.
First, one is generally drawn to phenomena that facilitate one’s ability to
get a handle on life, such as closure,336 clarity,337 simplicity,338 and
measurability.339 If one stares fully at some of the ideas suggested in this
Article, one has to confront some complexities that might be troubling. For
example, that factual guilt versus nonguilt is quite often a distinction that
does not exist in any objective sense.340 Or that, even where factual guilt
does exist, its overlap with legal guilt may be a lot smaller than typically
assumed and that, as a result, the number of defendants who are convicted,
punished, and subjected to myriad other consequences of conviction in the
absence of factual guilt is potentially much larger than typically assumed.
Further still, that the number of people who are not convicted but who have
committed crimes is potentially huge.341 This would make core criminal law
concepts, such as “offending,” “guilt,” “rehabilitation,” and “recidivism,”
335. Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for
Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011).
336. See Susan A. Bandes, Closure in the Criminal Courtroom: The Birth and Strange
Career of an Emotion, in EDWARD ELGAR RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW AND EMOTION
(Susan A. Bandes et al. eds., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3457952 [https://perma.cc/7YW6-5KDT] (“There is an
argument to be made that closure isn’t an emotion at all, but rather a set of legal aspirations
for the conduct of criminal proceedings.”); see also Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations
of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363,
1404 (2000) (“Both people and institutions need closure if they are to function at all, and the
most ego-syntonic approach individually and institutionally for all professional participants in
the criminal justice system is to treat the legally guilty as factually guilty.”).
337. See Susan A. Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 5, 9–10
(stating that a version of innocence embodied by DNA exoneration is appealing because
“simple categories and clear dichotomies are reassuring”).
338. See Findley, supra note 11, at 1207 (“[T]he Innocence Movement has drawn power
from the simplicity of the wrong-person story of innocence . . . . [B]ut that story alone . . .
fails to accommodate the vast majority of innocent people in our justice system.”).
339. See Richard A. Leo, Has the Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration
Movement?: The Risks and Rewards of Redefining Innocence, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 221, at 57, 70 (referring to “the human desire to
quantify and oversimplify complex social problems”).
340. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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more complicated to discuss and teach. It is simpler to say that our system
generally works well and that the number of times in which legal guilt does
not track factual guilt is definable, countable, and bearable. It is simpler to
say that we can generally let things rest after the appeals process has played
out and focus on how to rehabilitate people. It is simpler to say that we
generally lock up those who have committed crimes and that we can assess
their rehabilitation by seeing if they recidivate.
Second, one may be drawn more strongly to concepts like closure when
they offer comfort about the state of the criminal system and, in turn, of the
state of the nation.342 In other words, “just world theory” may be operative
here343—or at least a “just United States theory.”344 It is more comforting to
think that those who were subject to conviction, punishment, and other
consequences had a “first chance” rather than being (in potentially huge
numbers) the victims of a system where phenomena such as plea bargaining’s
predominance and the defense’s subordination jeopardize reliability.345 It
may also be more comforting to think that the “guilty” have been captured
and thus are not at liberty to “reoffend.”
Making some of these pressures still more salient is the identity of scholars
who write about the criminal system. Most are lawyers, many have worked
within the criminal system, and all could be said to have achieved
professional success. It is news when one of us has a criminal record.346 If,
342. See Patricia M. Wald, International Criminal Courts—a Stormy Adolescence, 46 VA.
J. INT’L L. 319, 342 (2006) (“How [a] nation defines criminal conduct, the punishments for
such conduct, and the procedures for determining guilt and innocence go to the root of a
country’s identity.”).
343. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight,
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 582 (1998) (“Individuals who subscribe to the just world theory believe
that ‘people usually get what they deserve.’” (quoting Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just
World Research and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL.
1030, 1030 (1978))).
344. Alex Kozinski argues that, instead of knowledge of an error rate, “[w]hat we have is
faith that our system works very well and the errors, when they are revealed, are rare
exceptions.” Kozinski, supra note 75, at xiv–xv (“Much hinges on retaining this belief: our
self image as Americans; the pride of countless judges and lawyers; the idea that we live in a
just society; confidence in the power of reason and logic; the certainty that none of us or our
loved ones will face the unimaginable nightmare of unjust imprisonment or execution; belief
in the incomparable integrity and accuracy of our system of justice; faith that we have
transcended medieval methods of conviction and punishment so that only those who are guilty
are punished, and their punishment is humane and proportionate.”).
345. See Simon, supra note 24, at 213 (“There is little doubt that this self-assurance in the
process’s diagnosticity caters to important psychological and societal needs. For one, people
tend towards favorable assessments of the prevailing social order, deeming it to be just and
legitimate. The mere notion that the state can wreck the lives of innocent people casts a
disconcerting shadow over the integrity of the system.”); Sklansky, supra note 190, at 29
(stating that we “pride ourselves on our ‘adversary system’”).
346. See, e.g., Katherine Long, Former Bank Robber Helped by Gates Fund Now Professor
at Georgetown Law School, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017, 2:21 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/former-bank-robber-helped-by-gates-fund-nowprofessor-at-georgetown-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/57FS-VGL3]; Lyle Moran, Refingerprinting of California Lawyers Turns Up Thousands of Criminal Records, ABOVE L.
(Mar. 28, 2019, 1:49 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/03/re-fingerprinting-of-californialawyers-turns-up-thousands-of-criminal-records/ [https://perma.cc/5K3K-QMJB].
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despite your legal training and acumen, you choose not to jump in and reduce
the lack of counsel for those who are poor, it may be comforting to rest on an
assumption that everyone gets a lawyer347—and maybe even an effective
one.348 If you have worked within the criminal system, it may be harder to
acknowledge the breadth of its vulnerabilities.349 If life has treated you well
and, perhaps despite your lawbreaking, you have no criminal record,350 you
may not wish to engage in a vigorous questioning of the extant distribution
of criminal convictions.351 You may not wish to point out that convictions
do something other than demarcate the guilty as distinguished from the
innocent.
B. Assumptions That Build
As I have pointed out in earlier work, even at the point of arrest,352 and
even prebooking,353 it is common for guilt to be assumed: note, for example,
how frequently arrestees are referred to as “offenders.”354 Upon a
prosecutorial charge, the next significant milestone in a criminal case, one
finds additional assumptions of guilt355 and, again, observes the liberal use
of the term “offender”356 even by those committed to system reform357 and
to challenging premature assumptions of guilt.358 So if we posit a crescendo
of assumptions as a case moves through the system—one that is fueled by
education and the media359—it may seem unsurprising that by the point of
conviction those assumptions hold firm even in the face of the kind of
vulnerabilities described in Part I.

347. See Bellacosa, supra note 50, at 39.
348. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 122 (2004) (“‘Getting what you pay for’
is an accepted fact of life, but justice, we hope, is different, particularly in criminal cases.”).
349. See Simon, supra note 24, at 213 (“The prospect of contributing to a wrongful
conviction poses a personal threat to the psyche of the people involved in its operation.
Ironically, the prevalent response to threats of this kind is to deny their existence.”).
350. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
351. See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 53 (2015) (“Consider the vast
number of never-arrested people who have committed, but have never been arrested for,
insurance or tax fraud; driving while intoxicated; possessing or selling illegal drugs; and
engaging in domestic violence and other assaults.”).
352. Roberts, supra note 4, at 989.
353. See Anna Roberts, LEAD Us Not into Temptation: A Response to Barbara Fedders’s
“Opioid Policing,” 94 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 91, 92 (2019).
354. See id.
355. See Nancy Gertner, Is the Jury Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 923, 931 n.44 (1995)
(citing a study that found that a “substantial number” of eligible jurors assume that merely
because a defendant was accused of a crime, it probably means they are guilty of some crime).
356. See Wisconsin SPD Training, Judge Mark Bennett—Addressing Unconscious Implicit
Bias in Voir Dire, VIMEO at 4:22, https://vimeo.com/163018292 [https://perma.cc/
AH7N-LKC4] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (“[F]ifty percent of the offenders [as opposed to
‘defendants’] we try in criminal cases are minority.”).
357. See Mark W. Bennett, Getting Clamorous About the Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L.
REV. ONLINE 1, 13 (2018) (noting “the unfairness created by the silence and prior offender
penalties” and suggesting reforms).
358. See id. at 10 n.59.
359. See Kozinski, supra note 75, at xxvii–xxviii.

2020]

CONVICTIONS AS GUILT

2543

C. Merger of Act and Crime
The legal scholarship described in Part I points toward a nuanced view of
“crime” in which one can recognize the multiple ways in which factors such
as the predominance of plea bargaining and the subordination of the defense
may stop defendants from bringing to light their lack of factual guilt. For
example, a winning mens rea argument may go unmade360 or an affirmative
defense that could and should triumph may never be investigated or
voiced.361 By contrast, the apparent fusion of legal and factual guilt
described in Part II may be aided by a prevalent pull toward a simpler view
of crime: one that focuses on the act component of the crime.
One commonly sees the act-crime merger in public discourse.362 Thus, for
example, only some homicides are crimes and only some criminal homicides
are murders.363 It is not unusual, however, for the reporting of homicide rates
to betray the assumption that they are crime rates and, indeed, to refer to them
as “murder rates.”364
One sees this fusion creeping into legal scholarship, too. For example,
among the various definitions given for “factual guilt,” a popular one assigns
factual guilt where the defendant “committed the act.”365 It is noteworthy
360. See Francis D. Doucette, Non-appointment of Counsel in Indigent Criminal Cases: A
Case Study, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 495, 496–99 (1997) (describing a Massachusetts marijuana
possession prosecution of two unrepresented defendants and, as part of a list of some of the
issues that went unexplored in advance of their guilty pleas, mentioning that “[n]o one advised
the two defendants that the Commonwealth lacked a certificate of chemical analysis, and that
the contraband seized from the vehicle had not even been submitted yet to a laboratory,” “[n]o
one advised the two defendants that, since neither one of them had been found in ‘actual
possession’ of the alleged contraband, the prosecution at trial would have the more difficult
burden of proving ‘constructive possession,’” and “[n]o one advised the two defendants that
the evidence of intent to distribute was woefully weak, if not non-existent”).
361. See Delgado, supra note 208, at 12–13 (“Generally, a criminal offense is committed
whenever an action fulfills a crime’s material elements. Although some would end the inquiry
here, our system of criminal law recognizes considerations collectively known as defenses.”).
362. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Entrapment, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1400
(2004) (“For the police and the public alike, the problem is explaining that a difference exists
between the fact of the bad act and the finding of guilt necessary to establish culpability.”).
363. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.
364. See Thomas P. Abt, Opinion, How Not to Respond to the Rising Murder Rate, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/opinion/murder-ratecrime.html [https://perma.cc/4H8S-RR5V] (discussing the rising homicide rate, in contrast to
the headline).
365. See, e.g., William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 845 (1988)
(noting that an individual is “factually guilty” when she “performed a given act”); Craig
Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 134,
136 (2006) (explaining that “[f]actual guilt” is “the actus reus, the physical or behavioral
component of the criminal act,” and adding that “factual guilt is what most laypersons mean
when they talk about whether someone is guilty—or in the case of miscarriages of justice and
subsequent exonerations, whether an ‘innocent’ person has been wrongly convicted”); Larry
May & Nancy Viner, Actual Innocence and Manifest Injustice, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 481, 482
(2004) (“‘[F]actual innocence’ [is] roughly synonymous for ‘did not commit the act that one
is accused of having committed.’”); Paul J. Mishkin, The High Court, the Great Writ, and the
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 81 n.84 (1965) (“As used throughout this
paper, the term ‘factual guilt’ or more simply ‘guilt’ refers to the individual having done the
acts which constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
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that this definition has gained so much currency, given that commission of
the act in and of itself is typically not enough to establish guilt.366 It is as if
there is a concept of crime, constituted by an act, which is in constant tussle
with our societal decision to establish via statute that more than just an act is
needed.367 Indeed, some scholarship openly espouses the view that mens rea
plays an unhelpful role.368
It may well seem unlikely that those who did not do the alleged act would
end up, in more than very small numbers, with convictions. Thus, if an act
all too easily comes to equal crime, then it would be understandable if
concern about widespread occurrence of conviction in the absence of factual
guilt was rare.
D. A Narrow Conception of Innocence
The tendency to view the act component of a crime as tantamount to the
crime is part of a tendency to view innocence narrowly. This narrow view
may be helped along by the dominance and success of the Innocence
Movement369 and the tendency to embrace its concept of “innocence.” This
concept tends to restrict “innocence” cases to “wrong man” cases.370 If one
assumes that you need to be the “wrong man” to be innocent371 and that
“wrong man” kinds of cases generally come to light, then it is understandable
that one would think that generally what we have when we consider those
who are convicted are those who committed crimes. That leaves the rest—
who may be the right man to the extent that there was one—all too vulnerable
to an assumption that they are not innocent.372

366. See Natapoff, supra note 189, at 1052 (mentioning the mens rea requirement that
exists “in all but a handful of cases”).
367. For instance, this is evidenced in the common usage of phrases like “unsolved crimes,”
or “unsolved murders.” See, e.g., Adam Nossiter, Yet Another Unsolved Murder Stirs Corsica
Against Its ‘Mafia,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/
world/europe/corsica-unsolved-murders-mafia.html [https://perma.cc/8V56-CGPD]. If we
were to be true to legal definitions of crimes and murders, there could be no such thing as an
unsolved crime or murder, since it is only in the “solving” that we determine whether there
was a “crime” or a “murder.”
368. See H. L. A. Hart, Crime and the Criminal Law by Barbara Wootton, 74 YALE L.J.
1325, 1325 (1965) (book review) (“Though [Barbara Wootton’s] first investigations were
confined to the criminal responsibility of the mentally abnormal her name has now become
identified with the claim that the whole doctrine of mens rea and the conception of
responsibility embodied in it is an irrational hindrance to sound social policy: if, as many
would admit, the purpose of the criminal law is to prevent crime, the doctrine should be
eliminated or at least allowed to ‘wither away.’”).
369. See Findley, supra note 11, at 1157 n.1 (offering definitions of the Innocence
Movement).
370. See Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 457
(2001).
371. See Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up: Accuracy and
Fairness Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1060 (2016)
(contrasting those who are “completely innocent” with those who may have plausible
defenses).
372. See May & Viner, supra note 365, at 482.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
Part III identified tendencies, at least among privileged communities, to
put a certain amount of faith in the criminal system and to conceptualize guilt
expansively and innocence narrowly, and suggested that they may contribute
to the apparent fusion mentioned in Part II. This Part explores implications
of this fusion, looking first at why it matters and then at what might be done
in response.
A. Why This Matters
First, it may be useful to explain what this Article is not saying about why
this fusion matters. It is not the point of this Article to say that it is (only)
the innocent (however broadly defined) about whom one needs to be
concerned and that if we could just get a close enough match between legal
and factual guilt we could rest easy in regard to our criminal system.373 Far
from it.374 Even if legal and factual guilt were as closely matched as possible,
a huge list of concerns would remain, including excessive use of the criminal
law;375 police, prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional abuse;376 race- and
class-based disparities in the application of the criminal law from the point
of criminalization onward and in the availability of paths away from criminal
conviction;377 harsh and counterproductive sentencing;378 and harsh and
counterproductive consequences of arrest, detention, charge, conviction, and
sentencing.379 Rather, this Article seeks to increase the prominence within
legal scholarship of reminders that a function of the criminal system viewed
as central to its work380—matching legal guilt as closely as possible to
factual—is shaky to an unknown and potentially large extent.381
It is important to acknowledge these vulnerabilities of the system, whether
one’s viewpoint is that they are ripe for reform or that they help illustrate the
structural inequalities that mean that convictions will never equal guilt. It is
important not just in service of accurate reflections about the system but also
in service of accurate reflections about those convicted by it. Assumptions
373. Thank you to Jocelyn Simonson for raising points to which this section tries to
respond.
374. See Alice Ristroph, The Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 305, 307 (2018) (“Mass incarceration, profound racial and socioeconomic
disparities, and the burdens of criminal records and collateral consequences, together with
high-profile and seemingly unnecessary uses of force by police officers, have prompted deep
criticisms from across the political spectrum.”).
375. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 613.
376. See Levin, supra note 52, at 522–23 (mentioning prison conditions and “violent law
enforcement”).
377. See, e.g., Pinard, supra note 42, at 967–68.
378. See Epps, supra note 16, at 1117.
379. See, e.g., Pinard, supra note 42, at 969 (noting that “long-lasting legal barriers that
attach to each conviction make it difficult or even impossible for individuals to move past
their criminal records”).
380. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1386 (describing accuracy of result as “the most
fundamental goal of the criminal justice system”); Hessick, supra note 53, at 277 (“[O]ur
criminal justice system exists in order to sort the guilty from the innocent.”).
381. See Thomas, supra note 54, at 546.
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that legal guilt connotes factual guilt are not, of course, racially, ethnically,
or economically neutral. Convictions are imposed in disproportionate
numbers on poor people and people of color.382 To assume that a conviction
connotes factual guilt is to downplay the threats to reliability posed by, for
example, the plea’s predominance and defense counsel’s subordination, both
of which fall more heavily on those exposed to disadvantage because of their
poverty, race, and/or ethnicity.383 It is problematic to buy into the
implication embedded in such an assumption—that criminality occurs
disproportionately among those who are poor and of color—without
confronting the fact that accurate adjudication is a luxury rarely afforded to
defendants who are poor and of color.384 And to the extent that to assume
crime commission is to assume risk and danger, this fusion enhances the
threats faced by people of color.385 Finally, an assumption that to be free of
convictions is to have lived a law-abiding life runs the risk of compounding
“White credit” and reinforcing a sense of white innocence,386 all while
downplaying the extent to which those endowed with whiteness and/or other
forms of privilege can avoid findings of guilt.387
In addition to further jeopardizing those who are targets of race- and classbased stereotypes, an assumed fusion of those who are convicted with those
who have committed crimes risks hampering efforts to inspire concern about
the fate of those with convictions. Some simply care less about people’s
suffering or are more desirous of it if they view them as having committed
crimes.388 And if, as suggested above, part of a reformist agenda is to reduce
correctional abuse, sentences, and the consequences of convictions and
sentencing, those efforts may get more traction if care has been taken to resist
an assumption that all those convicted committed crimes.389
Finally, there is much need for accuracy within criminal justice analyses,
and academics have a crucial role to play in helping to enhance it. From the
rough-and-ready way in which the criminal system is sometimes described,
you might not know that lives and lifelong consequences are at stake. You
might not know that we are speaking of one of the state’s gravest functions.
So, arrests get treated as guilt,390 homicides as murders,391 arrest rates as
382. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
383. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1346.
384. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
385. See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the
Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1508 (2016) (“African-Americans’ exposure to the police occurs
against the background of stereotypes of African-Americans as violent and dangerous,
increasing the likelihood that police officers will interact with African-Americans from the
perspective that violent force is both necessary and appropriate.”).
386. See Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System,
66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 873–74 (2015).
387. For an observation about the ability to buy one’s way out of certain charges and into
diversion, see King, supra note 220, at 591.
388. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
389. See Epps, supra note 16, at 1150 (“If people thought [false convictions] were more
common, they might be more concerned about harsh treatment of the convicted.”).
390. See supra notes 352–54 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
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crime rates,392 and so on. In the absence of independent analyses, the state’s
narrative can easily become the dominant narrative,393 and yet of course the
state has an interest in legitimatizing itself. Academia’s role as a source of
independent, accurate, well-supported criminal justice research is a vital one.
B. What Might Be Done
This section, too, begins with a caveat: if we are concerned about the
reinforcement of assumptions about the criminal system and those on whom
it operates, legal scholarship should, of course, not be the only focus of our
concern. In earlier work, I have identified unwarranted assumptions of guilt,
and unwarranted assumptions about what convictions mean, on the part of
jurors, prosecutors, defense attorneys, legislators, and judges.394 It would be
strange to exempt one’s own group, particularly when one’s own group has
such an important role to play regarding accuracy, detachment, and rigorous
sourcing. In what follows, I offer reform suggestions under three headings,
focusing on statistics, vocabulary, and framing.
1. Statistics
In a variety of areas, an understandable desire for statistical insight into the
criminal system and its challenges runs the risk of reinforcing assumptions
of widespread guilt and a narrow definition of innocence. Even when the
statistical research itself is cautious, narrow, and explicit about its lack of
generalizability, those caveats are often lost in later use of the results.
Thus, for example, as discussed above, many have been eager to try to pin
a number on the percentage of convictions that are “wrongful.” When those
figures are then circulated without caveat as if they represent the proportion
of those with convictions who are “innocent,” we are at risk of cabining
reliability concerns and thus of reinforcing the notion that the factual guilt of
those with convictions can, by and large, be assumed. We are at risk of losing
sight, for example, of the broader view of innocence advanced in this Article
and thus at risk of undermining key parts of criminal law, such as mens rea
and affirmative defenses,395 and obscuring key parts of our criminal system,
such as the predominance of plea bargaining and the subordination of the
defense. We are also at risk of losing sight of the fact that many winning
claims of “innocence”—even innocence narrowly defined—may never come
to light.396 Thus, those describing the prevalence of “wrongful conviction”
or conviction of the “innocent” should be explicit about what they mean by
these terms and careful in their use of data.

392. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 989.
393. See id.
394. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
395. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1357 (“Much legal theory remains devoted to defining
mens rea and defenses as a way of capturing deep principles of criminal justice.”).
396. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, “recidivism rates” are commonly proffered, perhaps because
they promise to tell us so much about a topic of wide interest.397 But they
bring a whole range of concerns.398 As I have discussed in earlier work, the
unquestioned use of arrest as a sign of a “return to criminal conduct” risks
endorsing an early assumption of guilt.399 And as this Article suggests, to
assume that a conviction represents “criminal conduct” or a “return to
criminal conduct” is something that should not be done without caveat.
“Recidivism” is, therefore, a term whose metrics need to be made explicit,
and the vulnerabilities of the chosen metrics, as they apply to both alleged
episode one and two, should be explored, lest silence endorse unwarranted
assumptions of guilt and of systemic accuracy.400
2. Vocabulary
There are a number of vocabulary items whose use should be complicated
or abandoned in light of this Article’s arguments. Several of them are
independently objectionable.401 For example, terms such as “felon,”
“criminal,” “murderer,” and “rapist”—even “misdemeanant”—all convey
labeling and stigma,402 and scholars may avoid them as a result. But this
Article suggests an additional reason to jettison them. One reason that they
convey stigma is that they convey not just conviction of a crime but
commission of a crime. If one comes to doubt the appropriateness of
assuming the accuracy of a conviction, one may wish to avoid these terms.
Less obviously stigmatizing, but still highly problematic, is the common
term “offender” and all its subcategories (“violent,” “nonviolent,”
“persistent,” “repeat,” “sex,” “juvenile,” and so on). Again, one may reject
it because of its labeling effect or its suggestion of essentialism and
permanence. But, as mentioned earlier, there is another reason to reject it:
its definition nestles factual guilt neatly within legal guilt. And in using it,
legal scholars seem to follow the dictionary’s lead, gliding from usage that
397. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 989.
398. See supra notes 299–303 and accompanying text.
399. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 989.
400. See Hornstein, supra note 95, at 11–12 (“When [a hypothetical person who is poor,
African American and from the inner city] is arrested and charged the third time, he is more
likely to face imprisonment. At that point, [he] may wish to plead ‘not guilty’ and go to trial.
If he does so, he will have two choices: (1) He may elect to testify and deny his guilt, in which
case his prior convictions may be used to impeach and he will likely be convicted; or (2) He
may elect to forego his right to testify in order to prevent his prior convictions from coming
before the jury, in which case he is likely to be convicted. If this scenario has any ring of
truth, it ought to lead us to question the validity of such statistical studies as recidivism rates.”).
401. See Victoria Law & Rachel Roth, Commentary, Names Do Hurt: The Case Against
Using Derogatory Language to Describe People in Prison, REWIRE NEWS (Apr. 20, 2015,
1:53 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2015/04/20/case-using-derogatory-language-describeperson-prison/ [https://perma.cc/98VZ-FKEU] (noting that even news stories that draw
attention to criminal system abuses can “undercut[] the humanity of the people featured with
derogatory phrases” and criticizing terms that include “offender,” “criminal,” “ex-offender,”
“ex-con,” and “felon”).
402. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 566 (stating that “felonies and felons” are subjected to
“informal social stigma”).
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is, or could be, about legal guilt, to usage that seems to suggest an assumption
of factual guilt. If the term is preserved, it would be useful for legal scholars
to be clear about whether in using it they mean “person convicted of a
crime”403 or “person who committed the crime,” and if they view the latter
as wrapped up within the former, to be explicit about why.
Scholars should also be careful and explicit about the definitions of “guilt”
and “innocence” with which they are working. Using “factually guilty” to
refer to someone believed to have committed the alleged act—regardless of
other components of the alleged crime and defenses—may contribute to the
wasting away of things like mens rea and affirmative defenses as crucial
components of our definitions of crime. Using “innocent” in a way restricted
to those who are believed not to have committed the alleged act brings the
same risks.
As a flip side of these kinds of vocabulary efforts, one should be alert to
language choices that risk conveying an assumption that those without
convictions are crime-free. To perpetuate this assumption is to endorse
conviction as an appropriate, sufficiently accurate divider between two
camps. Thus, instead of referring to those without convictions as those who
have lived a law-abiding life,404 one could refer to them as people without
convictions. So, too, the push for “leniency,” which appears to urge that the
government be kinder than usual to certain people with convictions, may
unwittingly further a sense that the system in general works well, in terms of
both who is convicted and what sentences they receive.405
These kinds of language choices matter.406 And the desire to explore the
assumptions that may lie behind current choices, in order to push for different
choices, has parallels in other reform efforts. The drive to rename the
“criminal justice system” the “criminal legal system” is one example.407 So,
too, is the effort to abandon the description of life-changing,408 and
sometimes life-threatening, consequences of conviction as “collateral
consequences.”409

403. See Pfaff, supra note 116, at 179 (stating that, in his article, “‘drug offender’ refers to
someone convicted of a drug offense, not someone who commits crimes while on drugs or in
furtherance of a drug habit, nor someone who commits violent crimes as a result of the
disruptions caused by drug enforcement”).
404. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
405. See Roberts, supra note 353, at 102 (mentioning the risk that discussions of “leniency”
endorse the notion that the mainstream criminal justice system is normal and fair).
406. See Lynch, supra note 173, at 2136 (noting that “the prevailing terminology subtly
prejudices our thinking”).
407. See Carol Jacobsen & Lynn D’Orio, Defending Survivors: Case Studies of the
Michigan Women’s Justice & Clemency Project, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 n.12
(2015).
408. See Peter Goldberg, Exec. Dir., Brooklyn Cmty. Bail Fund, Remarks at the Brooklyn
Historical Society Event: Petty Crimes and Petty Laws: A Hard Look at the Broken
Misdemeanor System (Jan. 28, 2019) (event attended by author) (explaining that so-called
“collateral consequences” are in fact big, life-changing consequences).
409. See id.
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3. Keeping the Caveat in Mind
Finally, those who are persuaded that the vulnerabilities in the system are
such as to leave a question mark hanging over the extent of its accuracy may
wish to approach with care the kind of progressive statements mentioned in
Part II. Because, yes, a second chance is important, but more important is a
first; rehabilitation and redemption are good, but only if there was a flaw or
sin; lenience is welcome, but no punishment is “lenient” in the absence of
guilt; poverty may be criminogenic (in the sense of making one a “criminal”),
but part of the “criminogenesis” is that those without money are at risk of
crushing pressure to plead guilty with no adequate representative to push
back. Even as we strive for better treatment for those with convictions, let
us not erase the risk of convictions without guilt.410
CONCLUSION
We have learned lessons from stories of exoneration, but they have been
too narrow. They are too often restricted to a certain type of innocence and
their full implications are too often papered over by assumptions that, in
general, convictions connote factual guilt. This Article seeks to emphasize
the role of legal scholars, both in comprehending the potential breadth of
innocence and in exploring the breadth of its implications. It cautions against
a language of reform that may, even as it strives toward progressive changes,
reinforce regressive assumptions that convictions equal guilt.

410. For an analogous proposal, based on an analogous sense that a particular portrayal of
the criminal justice system can be damaging, see Epps, supra note 16, at 1150 (stating that
“we should stop asserting that it’s better for many guilty persons to go free to save one
innocent from punishment and proclaiming that our system complies with that command” and
adding that “[t]he constant assertions that our system heavily skews errors in favor of
acquitting the guilty create the impression that false convictions are quite rare and that our
procedural system is scrupulously fair to the innocent”). For an analogous suggestion that
exploration of innocence and other efforts at reform can be “mutually enhancing,” see Roberts,
supra note 133, at 835.

